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ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically examines the relationship between market structure and prices 
in the Korean retail gasoline market. Korea has experienced big changes in the number of gas 
stations. For example, nationally the number of gas stations increased 24.9% from 10,406 in 
2001 to 13,003 in 2010, but in Seoul the number of stations dropped 24.9% from 816 in 2001 to 
613 in 2013.  
In the literature, the empirical research about the relationship between the market 
structure and prices in the retail gasoline market has been done in two ways. First, studies with 
regression models have mainly focused on finding market structure as the determinant of retail 
prices. Second, a few studies with structural models have assessed the impacts of mergers on 
prices. However, previous studies had some limitations: (1) most regression analyses did not 
evaluate the long-term impact because they used cross-sectional data or short-term panel data; 
more importantly, they did not successfully correct an endogeneity problem because they used 
a controversial instrumental variable; (2) because quantity data at the station level were rarely 
accessible, it was not easy to utilize a structural model. 
I try to overcome these limitations of the previous studies in two ways. In the first 
chapter, I run a regression with long-term panel data and a new instrumental variable which 
has never been used in the literature. In the second chapter, I estimate a structural model 
without sales data from gas stations to evaluate the impact of changes to the market structure 
on prices and welfare.  
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In Chapter 1, I employ monthly data between January 2003 and December 2011 from 
seven big cities in Korea to estimate the effects of station density on average retail prices and 
average sales per station. Instead of population density, which has been commonly used in 
previous studies, I use the density of diesel cars as the new instrumental variable. The density 
of diesel cars is a superior instrument to population density in two respects. First, the 
correlation between station density and the new instrument is obviously expected to be higher 
than the correlation between station density and population density, because demand for 
stations depends on the number of cars rather than the number of people. Second, population 
density may well represent demand for gasoline and therefore have a direct impact on the 
retail price. Meanwhile, the density of diesel cars satisfies instrument exogeneity because it is 
not a determinant of gasoline price.  
Estimation results yield the following findings. First, regarding a price equation, an OLS 
estimate of station density is negative but statistically insignificant. However, an IV estimate of 
station density is negative and statistically significant. The results demonstrate that the OLS 
estimate underestimates the impact of station density on prices. The IV estimation results show 
that a 10% increase in the number of stations per square kilometer is associated with a 
0.68-0.95% decrease in retail prices. Second, regarding a sales equation, the OLS and IV 
coefficient estimates of station density are negative, statistically significant and very similar in 
magnitude. A 10% increase in station density is associated with a 4.2-5.9% decrease in station 
sales. These findings also imply that the number of stations is an endogenous variable with 
respect to price, but not with respect to sales. This is the same as the result of Sen and Townley 
(2010), who examined the retail gasoline industry in Canada.  
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In Chapter 2, with June 2009 data from 270 gas stations located above the Han River in 
Seoul, Korea, I use a structural model and conduct counterfactual experiments to estimate the 
effects of market structure on prices and welfare. My research is different from previous 
studies. I estimate the model without quantity data from the gas stations by employing the idea 
of Thomadsen (2005), while previous studies used sales data by directly following the work of 
Berry et al. (1995). In general, it is difficult to obtain quantity data from gas stations because 
they keep them secret. Also, data richness allows me to introduce different contractual forms 
between refiners and stations in the supply model, while previous studies assumed because of 
data limitations that there was only one type of vertical relationship.   
The counterfactual experiments yield the following results. First, although the change 
to company-owned GS (or HD) stations increases their prices, the prices of company-owned SK 
stations decrease, decreasing average price. Consumer welfare also decreases because the base 
utility of GS (HD) stations is smaller than that of SK stations. Second, the change to 
non-company-owned SK stations decreases the average price because the decreasing effects of 
ownership changes on prices outweighs the increasing effects of change in vertical contracts on 
marginal costs, which increases consumer welfare. Third, the change to non-company-owned 
S-Oil stations greatly lowers the average price mainly because the refiner’s wholesale price is 
the lowest among all refiners. Finally, the exit of stations causes an increase in average price.  
The above analysis implies that drop in the number of gas stations leads to very 
different effects on price and welfare, depending on how brand and contractual form change. 
Therefore, policies to affect market structure should be developed and implemented with 
caution because they may have unanticipated effects.    
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CHAPTER 1 
GAS STATION DENSITY AND PRICE COMPETITION IN THE KOREAN RETAIL 
GASOLINE MARKET 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I empirically evaluate the effects of the number of gas stations on the 
average retail gasoline prices and average sales per station. Korea has experienced big changes 
in numbers of gas stations. For example, nationally the number of gas stations increased 24.9% 
from 10,406 in 2001 to 13,003 in 2010, but in Seoul the number dropped 24.9% from 816 in 
2001 to 613 in 2013. The effects on market performance of changes to market structure are an 
interesting issue not only to economists but also to policy makers, including competition 
authorities. For instance, the authorities often block mergers of retail outlets or approve them 
on condition of the divestiture of some outlets because they believe that mergers may lessen 
competition and increase prices. 
The empirical research about the relationship between market structure and price in 
the retail gasoline market has been done in two ways. First, studies with regression models 
have mainly focused on the market structure as the determinant of the retail prices at gas 
stations, at the city or state level. Second, a few studies with structural models have assessed 
the impacts of mergers on prices. However, previous studies had some limitations: (1) most 
regression analyses did not evaluate the long-term impact because they used cross-sectional 
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data or short-term panel data; more importantly, they did not successfully correct the 
endogeneity problem because they used a controversial instrumental variable; (2) it was 
difficult to use structural models because the sales data of individual gas stations were not 
generally available. 
I try to overcome these limitations in two ways. In this chapter, I run a regression with 
long-term panel data and a brand new instrumental variable. In Chapter 2, I estimate a 
structural model without sales data from the gas stations to examine the impacts of changes to 
market structure on prices and welfare.  
I employ monthly data between January 2003 and December 2011 from seven big 
Korean cities in to estimate the effects of station density on average retail prices and average 
sales per station. Instead of population density, which has been commonly used in previous 
studies, I use the density of diesel cars as the new instrumental variable. The density of diesel 
cars is a superior instrument to population density in two respects. First, the correlation 
between station density and the new instrument is obviously expected to be higher than the 
correlation between station density and population density because demand for stations 
depends on the number of cars rather than the number of people. Second, population density 
may well represent demand for gasoline and therefore have a direct impact on retail price. 
Meanwhile, the density of diesel cars satisfies instrument exogeneity because it is not a 
determinant of gasoline price.  
Estimation yields the following findings. First, regarding a price equation, the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimate of station density is negative but statistically insignificant.  
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However, the instrumental variable (IV) estimate of station density is negative and statistically 
significant. A comparison of the two estimates implies that OLS underestimates the impact of 
station density on price. The IV estimation results associate a 10% increase in the number of 
stations per square kilometer with a 0.68-0.95% decrease in retail prices. Second, regarding a 
sales equation, the OLS and IV coefficient estimates of station density are negative, statistically 
significant and very similar in magnitude. A 10% increase in station density is associated with a 
4.2-5.9% decrease in station sales. These findings also imply that the number of stations is an 
endogenous variable with respect to price, but not with respect to sales, which is the same 
result Sen and Townley (2010) got when they examined the retail gasoline industry in Canada. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature; Section 3 describes data and summary statistics as well as the retail gasoline industry 
in Korea; in Section 4, I provide a theoretical framework; in Section 5, I present regression 
models and estimation results; Section 6 tests robustness; and Section 7 concludes the chapter.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
This study is partially motivated by the fact that existing theoretical models do not 
agree in the direction of the relationship between the number of firms and prices. In Section 4, 
which discusses the theoretical framework, I review in detail the literature about 
price-increasing and price-decreasing competition.  
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There are a number of empirical studies which use regression models to address the 
relationship between the number of sellers and prices in the retail gasoline industry.1,2 As 
mentioned in the Introduction, they mainly use cross-sectional data or short-term panel data 
because they focus on finding what factors are determinants of retail prices rather than 
evaluating the long-term impact of station density on those prices.  
Most studies have found a negative relationship by OLS estimation. Barron et al. (2004) 
used a one-day price survey at the station level in four U.S. cities (Phoenix, Tucson, San Diego 
and San Francisco). They found that a 50% increase in the number of stations within a 1.5 mile 
radius meant a 0.3-0.6% decrease in the average price, depending on the city. Meerbeeck (2003) 
used weekly prices at the station level in Belgium from March 1998 to March 2001. However, 
the data did not contain any variation in the number of stations over time, even though it was 
three years. He also found a negative relationship between the number of stations located in a 
municipality and the prices. Pennerstorfer (2009) used cross-sectional data at the station level 
on 400 Lower Austrian stations in September 2003. He usds a spatial lag model which 
considered price dependence among stations in the market and also found a negative 
relationship between the number of stations within 15.5km and prices. Shepard (1993) used 
data from a cross-sectional census of gas stations in a four-county area in eastern 
Massachusetts in 1987. She also showed that prices decrease with the number of the stations 
in a one-mile radius. Cooper and Jones (2007) examined station-level data from Lexington, 
Kentucky, during a four-month period from May to August 2001. Their OLS estimates indicated 
                                            
1 A literature review of papers using structural models is presented in Chapter 2.  
2 See Eckert (2011) for a general review of the empirical literature on the retail gasoline industry. 
5 
 
that one more competitor on the commuter route was associated with a 0.28 to 0.57-cent 
decrease in price. Yoon and Lee (2008) used cross-sectional data at the station level for 380 
stations in Seoul, Korea, in December 2007. They reported that a 20% increase in the number of 
stations within a district was associated with a 0.18% decrease in prices. Nam and Oh (2010) 
used cross-sectional data at the station level for 694 stations in Seoul in October 2008. Their 
estimates suggested that one more station within a 1km radius led to a decrease of 2.6 won per 
liter in gasoline prices. Meanwhile, Hoseken et al. (2008) did not find any association between 
the number of stations within a 1.5 mile radius and prices, using the weekly station-level data 
of 272 stations in northern Virginia from 1997 to 1999. As Evans et al. (1993) claimed, however, 
these studies with OLS regression models for price with market structure variables yielded 
biased estimates because performance feeds back into structure, causing a simultaneous 
equation bias.   
Unlike the above studies, Clemenz and Gugler (2006) used cross-sectional data at the 
district level in Austria, with population density as an instrumental variable for station density. 
Their very similar OLS and IV estimates associated a 10% increase in the station density of 
districts with a 0.35% average decrease in prices, implying that station density is an exogenous 
variable with respect to price. 
To my knowledge, Sen and Townley (2010) is the only paper on the retail gasoline 
industry that has explicitly evaluated the long-term effect of station density on prices (and 
station sales) and used an instrumental variable to avoid biased coefficient estimates of station 
density. They were motivated by Canada’s rationalization, or significant drop in the number of 
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gas stations, in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, the stations declined 44.7% from 23,952 in 1980 
to 13,250 in 2000. Therefore, Sen and Townley (2010) examined the impacts of outlet 
rationalization on retail prices and sales, employing monthly city-level data from 10 Canadian 
cities between 1991 and 1997. Like Clemenz and Gugler (2006), they also used population 
density as an instrumental variable. They found that a 10% reduction in station density was 
associated with a 7.0-8.7% increase in retail prices and an 8.5% increase in station sales. 
However, as they acknowledged, population density could be a poor instrument because it may 
well represent demand that has a direct impact on retail prices.  
 
1.3 Retail Gasoline Industry in Korea and Data 
 
1.3.1 Institutional Details 
 
Gasoline is provided to final consumers in three ways. The first way is that refiners 
supply it directly to consumers who regularly need large amounts of it. Such consumers include 
airlines and the Department of Defense; in 2007, 11.7% of domestically consumed gasoline was 
provided in this way. The second way is that refiners sell it to stations, and the stations provide 
it to the consumers; in 2007, 44.4% of domestically consumed gasoline was provided in this 
way. The last way is that wholesalers buy it from the refiners and sell it to the stations, who 
provide it to the consumers; in 2007, 43.9% of domestically consumed gasoline was provided in 
this way.  
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There are four refiners in Korea, which are SK, GS, HD and S-Oil in order of market 
share. In December 2012, there were 12,803 stations in the country. The numbers of the 
stations selling the respective brands were 4296(33.6%), 3164(24.7%), 2345(18.3%) and 
1942(15.2%). The independent stations numbered 1056(8.2%). However, the ratio of 
independent stations was lower in the city than in the country. For example, in Seoul, while the 
numbers of the stations with the SK, GS, HD and S-Oil brands were 259(41%), 189(30%), 
91(14.4%) and 72(11.4%), there were only 20(3.2%) independent ones. 
There are four types of vertical relationship between refiners and stations.3 In the first, 
the stations are owned by a refining company, and the managers are employed by the company. 
Therefore, the retail gasoline prices are determined by the refiners. In the second, the stations 
are owned and operated by a wholesaler who is not a refiner. The wholesaler tends to own 
more than two stations and buy gas from only one refiner. In the third, open-dealer stations are 
independently owned and managed with no investment from refiners.4 The numbers of 
company-owned, wholesaler-owned and open-dealer stations in Korea were 1117(8.7%), 
654(5.1%) and 11,032(86.2%) in December 2012. However, the ratio of company-owned 
stations is much higher in the city than in the country. For example, the numbers of 
company-owned, wholesaler-owned and open-dealer stations in Seoul were 198(31.4%), 
82(13.0%) and 351(55.6%) in December 2012.  
                                            
3 For details of contract forms, see Shepard (1993).  
4 The fourth kind of vertical relationship is lessee-dealer stations. Under the contract, the land and facility are owned by the 
refiner, but the managers are self-employed. Therefore, the retail prices are determined by the managers, but the refiners have the 
right to control and inspect the quality of the stations. Some rental fees are included in the contracts. The number of lessee-dealer 
stations is not known, but is considered to be very small. 
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The gas stations in Korea increased from 10,406 in 2001 to 13,003 in 2010, a 24.9% 
increase. A well-known factor among the various causes was a change in the law. The Korean 
government abolished a regulation about a required distance between stations in November 
1995.5 The change in the number of gas stations was different across cities, as discussed in the 
next section.  
 
1.3.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
I used monthly data from seven big cities (Seoul, Incheon, Daejon, Gwangju, Daegu, 
Ulsan and Busan) between January 2003 and December 2011, resulting in a sample of 756 
observations.6 The location of each city and some statistics such as population and size are 
shown in Figure 1.1. The monthly wholesale and retail prices of regular grade gasoline were 
obtained from Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC). KNOC collects daily retail gasoline prices 
from all gas stations and computes average monthly prices by cities. It also collects weekly 
wholesale prices from refiners and wholesalers and converts them into average monthly prices 
on a national basis. Therefore, unlike retail prices, wholesale prices contain no variation over 
cities.  
The number of stations and sales in each city were obtained from Korea Oil Station 
Association (KOSA). KOSA reports the number of stations by brands and by vertical relationships 
                                            
5 The regulation required stations to have 700m-1km between them in the cities and 2km in the country.  
6 Seven cities are designated by a related law as big cities. When the population of a city surpasses 1 million, the big city 
designation is discussed. 
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between refiners and stations at the end of each month. From the data, I computed some 
variables. First, I computed station density by dividing the number of stations in each city by the 
size of the city. Second, I used the number of gas stations by brand to calculate the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Third, I employed the share of company-owned stations 
among the total number of stations as another variable. Finally, the average sales per station 
were calculated by dividing the total sales in each city by the number of stations in it.   
The unemployment rate, population and city size were obtained from Statistics Korea.  
The number of diesel cars was obtained from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. 
Like station density, population density and the density of diesel cars were calculated by 
dividing the population and number of diesel cars in a city by its size.     
Significant cross-city and time-series variation is necessary to identify the impact of the 
number of gas stations and ensure that effects do not result from unobserved city-specific and 
time-specific shocks. In this respect, it is suitable to use Korean data. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 
show how market structure in the retail gasoline industry changed across cities during the 
sample period (January 2003 to December 2011). For example, the number of stations 
decreased 14.04% in Seoul, while it increased 38.49% in Gwangju. HHI decreased 9.19% in 
Gwangju, while it increased 10.7% in Incheon. The share of company-owned stations decreased 
61.25% in Gwangju, while it increased 9.93% in Seoul.  
 Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.2. The average city population and size 
are 3,280,120 inhabitants and 766 km2, respectively. The average number of stations per 
square kilometer is 0.57. The mean population per square kilometer is 4804 inhabitants. The 
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average number of diesel cars per square kilometer is 459. The average retail and wholesale 
prices of a liter of regular-grade gasoline are 1565.5 and 1464.9 won per liter, respectively. 
Figure 1.3 shows how the average retail and wholesale prices change over time. The correlation 
between them seems to be very high and indeed the correlation coefficient is 0.99. Finally, the 
mean of the monthly sales per station is 103,569 liters with a range across cities and over time.  
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
It is the conventional view that more firms lead to more competitive pricing, resulting 
in a negative relationship between number of firms and average price. However, the standard 
view has been challenged by theoretical studies and empirical evidence. In this section, I 
compare the predicted relationships between number of stations and average price for some 
models in the literature. My purpose is to provide insight regarding the predictions and set the 
stage for a subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
1.4.1 Price-Decreasing Competition 
 
Competition among gas stations can be characterized as a monopolistic competition 
whose two key concepts are product differentiation and free entry. Specifically, a spatial (or 
location) model is more likely to be suitable for the retail gasoline industry than a 
representative consumer model, because consumers prefer stations located near them and are 
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willing to pay a premium for them. Probably the most well-known spatial competition model is 
the circle model of Salop (1979). He shows a kink in the demand curve for a representative firm, 
suggesting that the demand curve can be divided into the two regions of monopoly and 
competition. Then he derives a symmetric Nash equilibrium of price p  and the number of 
firms n  for the two regions. The notations L  and c   mean the number of consumers 
around the circle and the rate at which a deviation from the optimal brand lowers a consumer’s 
utility, respectively. Fixed and marginal costs are denoted by F  and m , respectively.  
 
[Equilibria in monopoly region] 
 
1
,      /
2 2
m m
m
c
p m n cL F
n
  
                      (1-1) 
 
[Equilibria in competitive region] 
 
 ,      /c c
c
c
p m n cL F
n
                                (1-2) 
 
From equations (1-2), we can derive the negative relationship between the number of 
firms and average price. For example, an increase in the number of firms induced by either an 
increase in the market size L  or a decrease in the fixed cost F  decreases prices.  
Intuitively, this relationship makes sense. As the number of firms increases in a given 
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area, the distances between them decrease. It is clear that with spatial competition, prices 
increase with the distance between stations. Therefore, the average price is expected to 
decrease as the number of stations increases.  
 
1.4.2 Price-Increasing Competition 
 
Even though the standard precept of economics is that competition will lower prices, 
some recent empirical studies have suggested otherwise. Ward et al. (2002) found that the 
entry of private-label products raiseed the prices of name-brand products in the food industry. 
Using data for the anti-ulcer drug market from 1997 to 1993, Perloff et al. (2005) found that the 
price of existing brands increaseed when the entrant was relatively different from them. 
Thomadsen (2007) reported that it was possible for prices to be higher under duopoly than 
monopoly competition in the fast-food industry.   
Several theories have been suggested to explain the positive relationship between 
price and number of firms. The first is that when all consumers search to find prices, an increase 
in the number of firms makes it more difficult to find the lowest price in the market, which 
reduces the consumers’ incentive to search. Therefore, this may cause the equilibrium market 
price to increase with the number of firms (Stiglitz, 1987; Schulz and Stahl, 1996; Janssen and 
Moraga-Gonzalez, 2004). In the second, Rosenthal (1980) assumes that every firm faces two 
classes of consumers, a captured loyal group who consume their favorite brands regardless of 
price and a switching group who consume from the lower-price company. As more firms enter 
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the market, there is less chance of being the low price setter and hence more reason to focus 
on the captive market with higher prices.7 Finally, Chen and Riordan (2007, 2008) and Perloff et 
al. (2005) show that when a new entry entails product differentiation, prices under a duopoly 
may be higher than those under a monopoly. For example, Chen and Riordan (2008) 
demonstrated that the price sensitivity effect dominated the market share effect when the 
consumer values for the two products were drawn from a bivariate exponential distribution.8         
 
1.4.3 Price Equation for Empirical Analysis 
 
Besides the number of firms, prices under spatial competition are expected to increase 
with consumer transport and marginal costs. Moreover, market concentration may affect the 
retail prices. However, the direction of the impact may be uncertain, as discussed in Clemenz 
and Gugler (2005). In one case, prices may increase with the degree of concentration for two 
reasons: (1) in highly concentrated markets, (tacit) collusion is more likely to occur than in 
markets with fewer competitors; (2) when outlets’ nearest competitors are other outlets of the 
same firm, they are able to charge higher prices. In the opposing case, since market 
concentration is endogenously determined, firms with multiple outlets may charge lower prices 
because of low marginal costs. 
                                            
7 Equilibrium prices exist in mixed strategies. 
8 Duopolists want to reduce their price below the monopoly level in order to recover demand. This is called the market share 
effect. On the other hand, under product differentiation, a duopolist’s demand curve may be steeper than a monoplist’s. Therefore, 
consumers are less eager to buy the duopolist’s product in response to a price cut. In other words, the duoplist actually wants to 
raise their price above the monopolist’s level. This is called the price sensitivity effect. See Chen and Riordan (2008) for details.   
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To sum up the discussion in this section, the price equation and partial derivatives can 
be written as follows. Here, ,  ,  S T c  and H  denote density of firms, transport costs of 
consumers, marginal costs and market concentration, respectively: 
 
( , , , ,...)P P S T c H                              (1-3) 
/ ?;  / 0;  / 0;  / ?P S P T P c P H             
 
Equation (1-3) is the basis for the empirical analysis in Section 5.  
 
1.4.4 Sales Equation for Empirical Analysis 
 
A change in the number of gas stations may affect their average profitability.  Ideally, I 
would need diesel sales and revenue from other sources such as a car wash and convenience 
store as well as the gasoline sales to evaluate profitability. However, I assume that gasoline 
sales are an important determinant of station profitability, which seems to be a plausible 
assumption because the number of gasoline cars is bigger than the number of diesel cars.9 
Because total sales of gasoline for each city and each month are accessible, I can construct 
average sales per station (=total sales of gasoline /the number of stations) and estimate how 
much they are impacted by station density. 
 
                                            
9 For example, the number of gasoline cars was 4,080,069, while the number of diesel cars was 2,465,366, in the seven cities in 
2011. 
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1.5 Empirical Specifications and Results 
 
1.5.1 Model 
 
The following is a regression model based on equation (1-3) for evaluating the impact 
of station density on retail prices: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln
 
it it it it t it
i t t it
RP SD HHI CO WP UR
CFE YFE MFE u
          
     
         (1-4) 
 
Similarly, equation (1-5) is used to evaluate the impact of station density on average 
sales per station: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln
 
it it it it t it
i t t it
Sales SD HHI CO WP UR
CFE YFE MFE u
          
     
      (1-5) 
 
Here, i  refers to a city and t  to month or year. itRP  and itSales  are the average 
monthly retail price (in won per liter) of regular-grade gasoline and the average monthly sales 
per station (in kiloliters) in city i  at period t . Station density  is the number of gas stations 
per square kilometer.  
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The effects of retail market concentration on retail gasoline prices need to be 
controlled for to make sure that the coefficient estimate of station density is unbiased. Market 
concentration is commonly calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) found in the 
literature. Ideally, sales data from each station are needed to calculate HHI according to its 
definition. However, I did not have access to them. Instead, I control for the impact of market 
concentration on price by using the number of stations by brands and the share of 
company-owned stations. This approach is reasonable because the concept of market 
concentration is based on the distribution of firms or ownership. Therefore, itHHI  is 
computed from the number of stations by brands: SK, GS, HD, S-Oil and independents.10 The 
term itCO  means the share of company-owned stations.  
It is also necessary to control for cost shocks and demand shocks to ensure that the 
coefficient estimate is unbiased. To control for the impact of cost on retail price, I use the 
average monthly wholesale price of regular-grade gasoline. As explained above, wholesale 
prices tWP  vary only over time. Of course, the coefficient estimate of tWP  is expected to be 
positive. The unemployment rate itUR  is used to control for demand shifts resulting from 
business cycles. An increase in unemployment is expected to lower price as demand for 
gasoline decreases.   
Moreover, I use city fixed effects iCFE , yearly fixed effects tYFE  and monthly fixed 
effects tMFE  to control for the effects of unobserved city-specific and time-specific factors 
                                            
10 For simplicity of computation, independent stations are regarded jointly as one new brand. 
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that might also have an influence on retail price. Finally, note that I use the natural log of retail 
price, station density, HHI and wholesale price to make it easy to interpret the coefficient 
estimates.11 To check robustness, alternative specifications including log-linear, linear-log and 
linear models are used later. 
   
1.5.2 Endogeneity and an Instrumental Variable 
 
I am interested in evaluating the impact of station density on retail price. However, 
there is a possibility of simultaneous bias in the coefficient estimate of station density. For 
instance, higher retail prices or sales could lead to entry by new firms. Conversely, lower prices 
or sales could result in the exit of gas stations. If this is the case, an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate will be biased. 
Moreover, equation (1-4) might omit some variables that are correlated with station 
density and are determinants of retail price. For example, Eckert and West (2004) showed that 
a maverick firm, ARCO, entered the market in Vancouver, Canada, and charged lower retail 
price than competitors to secure a market share.      
Following Evans et al. (1993), I use a combination of instrumental-variable (IV) and 
fixed-effect procedures to correct for the endogeneity issue. As discussed above, many 
previous studies used OLS estimation despite the endogeneity problem, likely because it was 
difficult to obtain an appropriate instrumental variable. Clemenz and Gugler (2005), and Sen 
                                            
11 The share of company-owned stations and unemployment rate are not log-transformed because they are percentages.  
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and Townley (2010) used population density as an instrumental variable for station density.12 
The logic is that stations choose places where there are many consumers (Clemenz and Gugler, 
2005), or that increased population may imply new urban development and retail networks, 
including gas stations (Sen and Townley, 2010).  
However, population density may be not a valid instrumental variable for station 
density in two respects. First, it is possible that population density is a weak instrumental 
variable for station density because demand for stations is more likely to depend on the 
number of cars than the number of people. A correlation between population and number of 
cars may be low because the number of cars is affected by factors such as income, but there is 
a high correlation between the number of cars and the number of stations.13  
Second, as Sen and Townley (2010) point out, population density could well represent 
demand that has a direct impact on retail prices and may be, therefore, correlated with the 
error term itu in equations (1-4) and (1-5). An interesting and possible example is found in 
Clemenz and Gugler (2005).14 They say that “entry decisions in rural areas depend even more 
on population density than entry decisions in more densely populated areas” (p.235) and show 
that the coefficient estimate of station density on population density is bigger in rural districts. 
This suggests that an increase in population in big cities may not result in a proportionate 
increase in the number of stations, but just in an increase in sales per station, because there is 
not much available land in big cities. Therefore, in big cities like those used in this study, 
                                            
12 Anderson and Johnson (1999) also used population as a proxy for number of stations at the city level. 
13 An increase in teens or the senior population does not lead to an increase in the number of cars either. 
14 They use population density as their instrument because they do not differentiate between urban and rural areas. 
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population density does not seem to be an appropriate instrument for station density, since it 
may directly affect the price through increased demand per station.  
Hence, I chose the density of diesel cars as a new instrument for station density 
because it solves the problems mentioned above. 15 First, in terms of instrument relevance, 
the correlation between station density and the new instrument is expected to be higher than 
that between station density and population, because demand for stations depends on the 
number of cars rather than the number of people. Second, the density of diesel cars satisfies 
instrument exogeneity because it is not a determinant of gasoline price, while population may 
represent demand and therefore have a direct impact on retail prices. 
 
1.5.3 Estimation Results 
 
1.5.3.1 Impact of Station Density on Price 
 
Table 1.3 provides the estimation results for price equation (1-4). Column 1 shows the 
OLS estimation results. The OLS coefficient estimate of station density is negative but 
statistically insignificant. However, we cannot conclude that the number of stations per square 
kilometer does not have an impact on the average retail market price because of the 
endogeneity issue.  
                                            
15 As found in any econometrics textbook, a valid instrumental variable must satisfy the following two conditions: it should be 
correlated with an endogenous variable (instrument relevance); and it should be uncorrelated with an error term, which means it 
does not directly influence a dependent variable (instrument exogeneity). 
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Columns 2 and 3 show the IV estimation results when the density of diesel cars is used 
as the instrumental variable. Specifically, column 2 shows the first-stage regression results with 
station density ln itSD as the dependent variable. Column 3 contains the corresponding 
second-stage estimation results. The coefficient estimate of the density of diesel cars in column 
2 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which implies that an increase in the 
number of diesel cars leads to an increase in the number of stations. An F-test result also shows 
that we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level that the coefficient estimate of the 
instrument is equal to zero.16 Hence, because of the weak correlation between station density 
and the instrumental variable, I do not worry about the possibility that the second-stage IV 
coefficient estimate will be biased and inconsistent. 
The IV estimate of station density in column 3 is negative and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Furthermore, the IV estimate (-0.0692) is significantly larger than the OLS estimate 
(-0.0175) in terms of absolute value. This result implies that the OLS coefficient estimate of 
station density is biased and underestimates the impact of station density on prices; and 
furthermore, that the number of stations is inversely correlated with the average retail price. 
The coefficient estimate implies that a 10% increase in the number of stations, which is the 
average increase rate in the number of stations during the sample period across the seven cities, 
is associated with a 0.69% decrease in the retail prices. It is also economically significant, even 
though it seems to be very small. The margin rate in the retail gasoline market in 2010 is about 
                                            
16 The F-statistic is 18.77, which is bigger than 10. 
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5% of the retail price according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in Korea.17 
Therefore, a 0.69% decrease in the retail price is equivalent to a 13.84% decrease in the margin 
rate. Additionally, the statistical test is performed to add confidence to the estimation results. 
The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% level that station density is exogenous 
with respect to retail gasoline prices. Therefore, station density is found to be an endogenous 
variable with respect to price. 
For comparison, estimation results with population density as the instrumental variable 
are given in Table 1.4. The IV estimate of station density in column 3 is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The difference between the two estimation results stems from whether both 
instruments are valid. The first-stage estimates in column 2 demonstrate that population 
density is a weak instrument for station density because an F-test result shows that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level that the coefficient estimate of the instrument 
is equal to zero.18  
Why is population density a weak instrument for station density? This is because the 
correlation between population and the number of cars is very low in some cities. Table 1.5 
shows the OLS estimation results when car density is regressed on population density and other 
variables. Indeed, the coefficient estimate of population density is positive but statistically 
insignificant even at the 10% level. In addition, Figure 1.4 shows how population and the 
number of cars change over time in Busan. The number of cars shows an increasing trend, but 
population shows a decreasing one. Similar trends have also been observed in Daegu and 
                                            
17 “How to increase transparency in gasoline market,” press release, April, 16, 2011. 
18 The F-statistic is 0.23, which is smaller than 10. 
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recently in Seoul. Even though it is outside the scope of this study to find out why population is 
decreasing in these cities, two main factors may explain the phenomenon. First, according to 
Statistics Korea, these cities have a lower birth rate than other cities or provinces.19 Second, 
some people with low income tend to move out of cities because of high housing prices.  
In summary, the empirical estimates in Table 1.3 offer strong evidence that the 
existence of more stations is significantly correlated with lower retail price, even though there 
are conflicting theoretical models in the literature.    
 
1.5.3.2 Impact of Station Density on Sales 
 
Table 1.6 shows the estimation results of sales equation (1-5). The OLS estimates are 
given in column 1. The coefficient estimate of station density is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Columns 2 and 3 provide the IV estimation results with the density of 
diesel cars as an instrumental variable for station density. The coefficient estimate of station 
density is also negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimates are very similar between OLS and IV. Indeed, the Hausman test does not reject the 
null hypothesis that station density is an exogenous variable with respect to average sales per 
station. In the above subsection, station density was shown to be endogenous with respect to 
price, but exogenous with respect to sales. These are the same findings as Sen and Townley 
                                            
19 In 2011, Seoul, Busan and Daegu showed birth rates of 1.014, 1.078 and 1.146, respectively, while the national average birth 
rate was 1.244. 
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(2010). It implies that firms are more likely to make entry decisions based on price or margin 
than on sales.    
The OLS and IV estimates imply that a 10% increase in the number of stations results in 
about a 4-6% decrease in station sales. Therefore, the impact of station density on sales is much 
bigger than its impact (about 0.7%) on retail prices. This may be understood to suggest that the 
retail gasoline market shows monopolistic competition in which product differentiation and 
non-price competition are key characteristics.  
 For comparison, I estimate the sales equation using population density as an 
instrument for station density. The results are given in Table 1.7. The IV estimate of station 
density in column 3 is positive and statistically insignificant. Therefore, I conclude that 
population density is not a valid instrumental variable for station density, but the density of 
diesel cars is. 
 
1.6 Robustness Check 
 
1.6.1 Additional Functional Forms 
 
A log-log specification was used in equation (1-4) and (1-5) to estimate the impact of 
station density on retail prices and station sales. However, the results do not depend on the 
specific functional form chosen. I experimented with linear, log-linear and linear-log models in 
terms of two dependent variables (price and sales) and an independent variable (station 
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density). Table 1.8 provides OLS and IV estimates of the price equation based on the different 
functional forms. The estimation results are found in columns 1 and 2 for Log-Log, 3 and 4 for 
Log-Linear, 5 and 6 for Linear-Log, and 7 and 8 for Linear-Linear. As we can see, the result does 
not vary in that the coefficient estimate of station density is negative and statistically significant, 
and its magnitude is very similar for all four specifications.20 The OLS and IV estimates of the 
sales equation with the four functional forms are given in Table 1.9. As in the case of the price 
equation, the impact of station density on average station sales is quite similar for all 
specifications.21  
 
1.6.2 Alternative Measure of Market Concentration  
 
HHI was used in equations (1-4) and (1-5) to control for the impact of market 
concentration on retail prices and average sales per station. Table 1.10 shows the estimation 
results for the price equation when CR1 and CR2 are used as alternative measures of market 
concentration. CR1 and CR2 are calculated based on the numbers of stations by brands. The 
results do not change much, even though the coefficient estimates of station density become 
slightly bigger in terms of absolute value. Similarly, Table 1.11 shows the estimation results for 
the sales equation with CR1 and CR2 as alternative measures of market concentration. The 
results do not change here, either.22 
                                            
20 A 10% increase in station density is associated with a 0.68-0.95% decrease in retail prices. 
21 A 10% increase in station density is associated with a 4.1-6.7% decrease in station sales. 
22 However, the IV estimate of station density is negative but statistically insignificant when CR1 is used. 
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1.6.3 Additional Instrument 
 
Until now, I have mentioned only station density as an endogenous variable and have 
thus used an instrumental variable for it. However, HHI may be an additional endogenous 
variable because an increase in price may lead to the entry of stations and therefore affect HHI 
in equation (1-4). Therefore, I use an instrumental variable for HHI as well as station density. 
Variation in HHI is affected by horizontal mergers. There was a horizontal merger between two 
refiners, SK and Incheon Oil, in August 2006. As a result, Incheon Oil stations became SK 
stations in three cities (Seoul, Incheon and Busan) out of the seven.23 Therefore, I use a merger 
dummy as an instrument for HHI that takes the value of 1 from August 2006 to December 2011 
in these three cities. 
The IV estimation results for the price equation are given in Table 1.12. They 
demonstrate that the coefficient estimate of station density is negative, statistically significant 
at the 5% level, and does not change much in magnitude.    
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
I evaluate the impact of the number of gas stations on retail prices and station sales. 
Previous studies using regression models had two limitations: they did not evaluate the 
                                            
23 Incheon Oil did not have stations across all cities because it was a small refiner. 
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long-term impact because they use cross-sectional or short-term panel data; and they did not 
successfully correct for the endogeneity problem because they ignored it or used a 
controversial instrumental variable.  
I use monthly panel data for the nine years from 2003 to 2011 from seven cities in 
Korea. Instead of the commonly used population density, I use the density of diesel cars as a 
new instrument. The new instrument is superior to the old variable in two respects. First, the 
correlation between station density and the new instrument is expected to be higher than the 
correlation between station density and population density. Second, the density of diesel cars 
satisfies instrument exogeneity because it is not a determinant of gasoline price, while 
population density may represent demand and therefore have a direct effect on retail prices. 
I observe two findings about the estimation results. First, station density is an 
endogenous variable with respect to retail prices. The OLS coefficient estimate of station 
density underestimates its impact on retail prices. The IV estimation results show that a 10% 
increase in station density is associated with a 0.68-0.95% decrease in retail prices. Second, 
station density is an exogenous variable with respect to station sales. The OLS and IV estimates 
demonstrate that a 10% increase in station density is associated with 4.1-6.7% decrease in 
station sales.
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 Chapter 1 Tables and Figures 
Figure 1.1 Statistics in Seven Cities 
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Table 1.1 Change in Market Structure 
City Year #Stations Change HHI Change 
Share of  
Non-Open-Dealer 
Stations 
Change 
Seoul 
2003 755 
-14.040 
2890.101 
1.511 
40.927 
9.933 
2011 649 2933.778 44.992 
Incheon 
2003 356 
8.989 
2560.598 
10.698 
29.494 
-23.103 
2011 388 2834.520 22.680 
Busan 
2003 431 
14.617 
2610.290 
4.382 
24.130 
-12.753 
2011 494 2724.680 21.053 
Daejon 
2003 267 
7.865 
2521.146 
-4.751 
29.963 
-36.263 
2011 288 2401.379 19.097 
Daegu 
2003 420 
3.810 
2634.694 
-3.279 
25.238 
-15.484 
2011 436 2548.292 21.330 
Ulsan 
2003 247 
15.385 
2423.741 
9.682 
18.219 
7.852 
2011 285 2658.418 19.649 
Gwangju 
2003 239 
38.494 
2639.135 
-9.191 
39.749 
-61.237 
2011 331 2396.564 15.408 
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Figure 1.2 Number of Stations Across Cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Retail Price (won/liter) 756 1565.497 200.128 1243.630 2053.060 
Station Sales (kiloliter) 756 103.569 42.482 55.008 240.108 
Wholesale Price (won/liter) 756 1464.912 180.468 1190.770 1890.430 
Station Density (#/km2) 756 0.567 0.267 0.230 1.248 
HHI 756 2700.945 204.743 2349.285 3209.829 
Share of Non-Open-Dealer Stations (%) 756 29.248 7.786 14.671 49.206 
Unemployment Ratio (%) 756 4.022 0.705 1.7 6.5 
Density of Diesel Cars (#/km2) 756 458.803 386.448 97.938 1448.903 
Year 756 2007 2.584 2003 2011 
Month 756 6.5 3.454 1 12 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Figure 1.3 Retail and Wholesale Prices 
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Table 1.3 OLS and IV Estimation Results from Price Equation: Density of Diesel Cars as IV  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS First Stage Second Stage 
Variables Ln(RP) Ln(SD) Ln(RP) 
    
Ln(SD) -0.0175  -0.0692** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0337) 
Ln(HHI) -0.0199 -0.0116 -0.0336 
 (0.0360) (0.256) (0.0278) 
UR -0.00111 -0.00358 -0.00141 
 (0.00117) (0.00440) (0.00115) 
CO 0.000517 -0.00582*** 0.000192 
 (0.000337) (0.00184) (0.000340) 
Ln(WP) 0.869*** -0.00250 0.873*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0174) (0.00845) 
Ln(Density of Diesel 
Cars) 
 1.147***  
  (0.240)  
Constant 1.147** -7.614*** 1.251*** 
 (0.314) (1.728) (0.223) 
City FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Weak IV test - 18.77 
(p=0.004) 
- 
Hausman Test - - Endogenous 
(p=0.091) 
Observations 756 721 721 
R-Squared 0.989 0.995 0.989 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4 OLS and IV Estimation Results from Price Equation: Population Density as IV  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS First Stage Second Stage 
Variables Ln(RP) Ln(SD) Ln(RP) 
    
Ln(SD) -0.0175  -0.275 
 (0.0120)  (0.494) 
Ln(HHI) -0.0199 -0.179 -0.0777 
 (0.0360) (0.318) (0.103) 
UR -0.00111 -0.00959 -0.00338 
 (0.00117) (0.00607) (0.00511) 
CO 0.000517 -0.00589* -0.000995 
 (0.000337) (0.00318) (0.00323) 
Ln(WP) 0.869*** 0.00347 0.870*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0197) (0.00908) 
Ln(Population Density)  0.504  
  (0.961)  
Constant 1.147** -3.101 1.703* 
 (0.314) (9.200) (0.941) 
    
City FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Weak IV Test - 0.226 
(p=0.651) 
- 
Hausman Test - - - 
Observations 756 756 756 
R-Squared 0.989 0.992 0.982 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5 Regression of Car Density on Population Density  
Variables Ln(Car Density) 
  
Ln(Population Density) 0.535 
 (0.463) 
Ln(Per Capita GRDP) 0.0828 
 (0.0710) 
Constant 2.922 
 (4.532) 
  
City FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Month FE Yes 
Observations 756 
R-Squared 0.999 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
Figure 1.4 Population and Number of Cars in Busan 
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Table 1.6 OLS and IV Estimation Results from Sales Equation: Density of Diesel Cars as IV  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS First Stage Second Stage 
Variables Ln(Sales) Ln(SD) Ln(Sales) 
    
Ln(SD) -0.587***  -0.416** 
 (0.104)  (0.178) 
Ln(HHI) -0.452 -0.0116 -0.398** 
 (0.239) (0.256) (0.198) 
UR -0.0160** -0.00358 -0.0150*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00440) (0.00484) 
CO -0.00467** -0.00582*** -0.00360* 
 (0.00179) (0.00184) (0.00207) 
Ln(WP) -0.422*** -0.00250 -0.421*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0174) (0.0402) 
Ln(Density of Diesel 
Cars) 
 1.147***  
  (0.240)  
Constant 12.27*** -7.614*** 11.76*** 
 (2.105) (1.728) (1.764) 
    
City FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Weak IV Test - 18.77 
(p=0.004) 
- 
Hausman Test - - Exogenous 
(p=0.357) 
Observations 756 721 721 
R-Squared 0.978 0.995 0.978 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.7 OLS and IV Estimation Results from Sales Equation: Population Density as IV  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS First Stage Second Stage 
Variables Ln(Sales) Ln(SD) Ln(Sales) 
    
Ln(SD) -0.587***  1.242 
 (0.104)  (3.834) 
Ln(HHI) -0.452 -0.179 -0.0417 
 (0.239) (0.318) (0.852) 
UR -0.0160** -0.00959 7.20e-05 
 (0.00453) (0.00607) (0.0393) 
CO -0.00467** -0.00589* 0.00607 
 (0.00179) (0.00318) (0.0251) 
Ln(WP) -0.422*** 0.00347 -0.428*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0197) (0.0537) 
Ln(Population Density)  0.504  
  (0.961)  
Constant 12.27*** -3.101 8.324 
 (2.105) (9.200) (8.106) 
    
F-Test  0.226 
(p=0.651) 
 
Hausman Test   - 
Observations 756 756 756 
R-Squared 0.978 0.992 0.931 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.8 Additional Functional Forms for Price Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log-Log Log-Linear Linear-Log Linear-Linear 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
VARIABLES Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) RP RP RP RP 
         
Ln(SD) -0.0175 -0.0692**   -73.69*** -149.3***   
 (0.0120) (0.0337)   (16.14) (29.98)   
Ln(HHI) -0.0199 -0.0336 -0.0183 -0.0403 -24.61 -46.47 -26.54 -60.88 
 (0.0360) (0.0278) (0.0380) (0.0314) (48.41) (41.12) (52.23) (45.75) 
UR -0.00111 -0.00141 -0.00105 -0.00175 -1.207 -1.647 -1.332 -2.375 
 (0.00117) (0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00131) (1.851) (1.800) (1.812) (1.908) 
CO 0.000517 0.000192 0.000562 4.17e-05 0.550 0.0752 0.521 -0.250 
 (0.000337) (0.000340) (0.000356) (0.000318) (0.404) (0.463) (0.406) (0.409) 
Ln(WP) 0.869*** 0.873*** 0.869*** 0.873*** 1,370*** 1,379*** 1,370*** 1,379*** 
 (0.0113) (0.00845) (0.0114) (0.00843) (17.43) (14.11) (17.58) (14.39) 
SD   -0.0126 -0.120*   -99.75** -259.0*** 
   (0.0210) (0.0701)   (30.73) (69.18) 
Constant 1.147** 1.251*** 1.145** 1.443*** -8,235*** -8,093*** -8,109*** -7,678*** 
 (0.314) (0.223) (0.334) (0.296) (407.4) (316.2) (460.0) (384.8) 
         
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test  18.77 
(p=0.004) 
 7.82 
(p=0.031) 
 18.77 
(p=0.004) 
 7.82 
(p=0.031) 
Hausman Test  Endogenous 
(p=0.091) 
 Endogenous 
(p=0.069) 
 Endogenous 
(p=0.034) 
 Endogenous 
(p=0.026) 
Observations 756 721 756 721 756 721 756 721 
R-Squared 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.9 Additional Functional Forms for Sales Equation    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Log-Log Log-Linear Linear-Log Linear-Linear 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Variables Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) SALES SALES SALES SALES 
         
Ln(SD) -0.587*** -0.416**   -69.40*** -59.79***   
 (0.104) (0.178)   (7.909) (11.00)   
Ln(HHI) -0.452 -0.398** -0.475* -0.438** -37.75 -34.65** -41.81* -40.42** 
 (0.239) (0.198) (0.239) (0.203) (20.81) (16.96) (19.84) (17.23) 
UR -0.0160** -0.0150*** -0.0173** -0.0170*** -1.576** -1.518*** -1.787** -1.809*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00484) (0.00553) (0.00642) (0.488) (0.471) (0.563) (0.576) 
CO -0.00467** -0.00360* -0.00509* -0.00451* -0.375** -0.305** -0.459** -0.435** 
 (0.00179) (0.00207) (0.00220) (0.00272) (0.115) (0.134) (0.172) (0.205) 
Ln(WP) -0.422*** -0.421*** -0.423*** -0.421*** -42.92*** -42.82*** -43.04*** -42.79*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0402) (0.0395) (0.0402) (5.373) (4.934) (5.132) (4.671) 
SD   -0.833*** -0.722*   -106.1*** -103.8*** 
   (0.201) (0.395)   (11.23) (23.28) 
Constant 12.27*** 11.76*** 13.38*** 12.92*** 839.5*** 809.7*** 992.2*** 975.6*** 
 (2.105) (1.764) (2.264) (2.036) (168.0) (136.9) (162.7) (143.9) 
         
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Test  18.77 
(p=0.004) 
 7.82 
(p=0.031) 
 18.77 
(p=0.004) 
 7.82 
(p=0.031) 
Hausman Test  Exogenous 
(p=0.357) 
 Exogenous 
(p=0.783) 
 Exogenous 
(p=0.418) 
 Exogenous 
(p=0.936) 
Observations 756 721 756 721 756 721 756 721 
R-Squared 0.978 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.10 Alternative Measures of Market Concentration for Price Equation    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 HHI CR1 CR2 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Variables Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) 
       
Ln(SD) -0.0175 -0.0692** -0.0245 -0.0862*** -0.0228 -0.0949*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0337) (0.0128) (0.0334) (0.0148) (0.0327) 
Ln(HHI) -0.0199 -0.0336     
 (0.0360) (0.0278)     
UR -0.00111 -0.00141 -0.000824 -0.00109 -0.00110 -0.00153 
 (0.00117) (0.00115) (0.00104) (0.000988) (0.00116) (0.00114) 
CO 0.000517 0.000192 0.000496 0.000105 0.000454 -9.37e-06 
 (0.000337) (0.000340) (0.000283) (0.000299) (0.000246) (0.000257) 
Ln(WP) 0.869*** 0.873*** 0.869*** 0.873*** 0.869*** 0.872*** 
 (0.0113) (0.00845) (0.0110) (0.00813) (0.0109) (0.00805) 
CR1   -0.000898 -0.00133***   
   (0.000514) (0.000296)   
CR2     -0.000538 -0.00111*** 
     (0.000595) (0.000419) 
Constant 1.147** 1.251*** 1.027*** 1.040*** 1.031*** 1.074*** 
 (0.314) (0.223) (0.0780) (0.0474) (0.0893) (0.0532) 
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 756 721 756 721 756 721 
R-Squared 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.11 Alternative Measures of Market Concentration for Sales Equation    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 HHI CR1 CR2 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Variables Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) Ln(SALES) 
       
Ln(SD) -0.587*** -0.416** -0.580*** -0.360 -0.608*** -0.418* 
 (0.104) (0.178) (0.131) (0.226) (0.131) (0.223) 
Ln(HHI) -0.452 -0.398**     
 (0.239) (0.198)     
UR -0.0160** -0.0150*** -0.0152** -0.0142*** -0.0164** -0.0154*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00484) (0.00488) (0.00518) (0.00465) (0.00485) 
CO -0.00467** -0.00360* -0.00568** -0.00421 -0.00596** -0.00464* 
 (0.00179) (0.00207) (0.00211) (0.00272) (0.00231) (0.00276) 
Ln(WP) -0.422*** -0.421*** -0.417*** -0.418*** -0.418*** -0.419*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0402) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0393) (0.0392) 
CR1   -0.00467 -0.00319   
   (0.00478) (0.00360)   
CR2     -0.00535 -0.00379 
     (0.00434) (0.00340) 
Constant 12.27*** 11.76*** 8.853*** 8.711*** 9.077*** 8.886*** 
 (2.105) (1.764) (0.413) (0.394) (0.521) (0.450) 
       
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 756 721 756 721 756 721 
R-Squared 0.978 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.12 Additional Instruments for Price Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS IV IV 
  Density of diesel cars Density of diesel cars + 
Merger dummy 
Variables Ln(RP) Ln(RP) Ln(RP) 
    
Ln(SD) -0.0175 -0.0692** -0.0879** 
 (0.0120) (0.0337) (0.0358) 
Ln(HHI) -0.0199 -0.0336 -0.0950** 
 (0.0360) (0.0278) (0.0422) 
UR -0.00111 -0.00141 -0.00142 
 (0.00117) (0.00115) (0.00111) 
CO 0.000517 0.000192 0.000269 
 (0.000337) (0.000340) (0.000452) 
Ln(WP) 0.869*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 
 (0.0113) (0.00845) (0.00887) 
Constant 1.147** 1.251*** 1.743*** 
 (0.314) (0.223) (0.351) 
City FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 756 721 721 
R-Squared 0.989 0.989 0.989 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2 
IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE ON PRICES AND WELFARE:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I estimate the effects of market structure on prices and welfare using a 
structural model. The number of retail gas stations decreased by 8.7% from 691 in January 2008 
to 631 in December 2012 in Seoul, Korea. The change in the number of gas stations varies by 
brand and contractual form between refiner and station. The most noticeable feature is that 
the number of company-owned SK stations decreased by a sharp 36.2% from 116 in January 
2008 to 74 in December 2012.24 Meanwhile, stations with other brands or contractual forms 
did not decrease and may have increased. It can be inferred that company-owned SK stations 
exited the market, or changed their brand or vertical contract. Obviously, it can be further 
concluded that such changes in market structure affected retail gasoline prices.  
Motivated by such changes, I evaluate the effects of four possible changes in market 
structure on gasoline prices and welfare through counterfactual experiments. The changes are 
(1) company-owned SK stations become company-owned GS or HD stations by changing 
brand25; (2) stations become non-company-owned SK stations by changing contractual form; (3) 
                                            
24 SK is the largest refiner in Korea.   
25 There are four brands in the Korean retail gasoline industry: SK, GS, HD and S-Oil. 
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stations become non-company-owned S-Oil stations by changing both brand and contractual 
form; and (4) stations exit the market. 
There are many empirical studies which evaluate the relationship between market 
structure and prices in the retail gasoline industry. Most of them use regression models to find 
the determinants of retail prices such as number of competitors. However, regression results 
cannot be used to calculate what prices would be under a different market structure because 
they do not establish a causal relationship between prices and market structure.  
A few studies create a structural model and conduct a counterfactual analysis. However, 
my research is unique in three respects. First, I am interested in various market structure 
components such as number of stations, brand and contractual form, while previous studies 
only focused on mergers and computed prices after mergers. Second, I estimate the model 
without quantity data from gas stations by employing the idea of Thomadsen (2005), while 
previous studies used sales data by directly following the work of Berry et al. (1995). In general, 
the sales data of individual stations are rarely accessible because stations keep them secret. 
Third, data richness allows me to introduce different contractual forms (company-owned and 
non-company-owned stations) between refiners and stations in the supply model, while 
previous studies assumed that there was only one type of vertical relationship because of 
limited data.   
The data I use consist of the prices, locations, and station characteristics of 270 gas 
stations located above the Han River in Seoul, Korea, in June 2009.26 The identification strategy 
                                            
26 Of these 270 stations, 45 are company-owned SK ones. 
45 
 
is based on the work of Thomadsen (2005). A relationship between price and quantity is 
derived by using the assumption of utility maximization by consumers. The relationship is 
substituted into the firms’ first-order conditions of profit maximization from static Bertrand 
competition to jointly estimate the parameters of the utility function of consumers and the 
marginal cost function.  
I have some confidence in the estimated model in that (1) the two regression results 
using original data and fitted data from the structural model are similar, and (2) the own- and 
cross-price elasticities of stations are realistic in terms of sign and magnitude. Finally, the 
counterfactual experiments yield the following results. First, the change to company-owned GS 
(or HD) stations decreases average price. This is because their prices increase, but the prices of 
the company-owned SK stations decrease. Consumer welfare also decreases because the base 
utility of GS (HD) stations is smaller than that of SK stations. Second, the change to 
non-company-owned SK stations decreases average price because the decreasing effects of 
ownership change on prices outweigh the increasing effects of change in vertical contracts on 
marginal costs, and increases consumer welfare. Third, the change to non-company-owned 
S-Oil stations greatly lowers average price mainly because the refiner’s wholesale prices are the 
lowest among refiners, and increases total welfare. Finally, the exit of stations increases 
average price and decreases total welfare. In particular, I also find that the magnitude of the 
price increase from the structural model is similar to that from the IV estimation in Chapter 1. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related empirical 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the retail gasoline industry in Seoul. In Section 4, I 
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present a regression result as a preliminary analysis. Section 5 explains the structural model and 
estimation method. In Section 6, I present estimation results and a validity check of them. In 
Section 7, I conduct counterfactual experiments and discuss the meaning of the results. Section 
8 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
There have been many empirical studies which examine the relationship between 
market structure and retail gasoline prices by using regression models at the individual station, 
city or state level. For studies at an aggregate level, Sen (2003) estimated the impact of local 
retail market concentration and wholesale prices on average monthly retail prices in 11 
Canadian cities between 1991 and 1997. He found that wholesale prices were more important 
than market concentration in determining retail prices at the city level. Sen (2005) used similar 
data and concluded that an increase in the market share of independent stations was 
associated with a decrease in retail prices. Sen and Townley (2010) focused on the impact of 
outlet rationalization on retail prices. They found that a 27% decline in retail gasoline outlets 
across 10 Canadian cities between 1991 and 1997 resulted in a 9% increase in retail prices.  
For studies at the station level, they set up models in which prices (or margins) were a 
function of station characteristics, local competition, local demography, and vertical structure 
between refiners and stations. Regarding local competition variables, Barron et al. (2004), 
Meerbeeck (2003), Clemenz and Gugler (2006), Pennerstorfer (2009) and Shepard (1993) found 
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that the number of stations within a certain radius of a station was inversely associated with 
price.27 Barron et al. (2004), Cooper and Jones (2007), Yoon and Lee (2008) and Nam and Oh 
(2010) found that price increased as the distance to the closest station increased.28 Regarding 
station characteristics, Hastings (2004), Meerbeeck (2003) and Nam and Oh (2010) found that 
the presence of independent stations caused competitors to lower prices.29 Regarding 
contractual forms, Shepard (1993) found evidence that company-owned stations charged lower 
prices for full service unleaded regular (premium) gasoline than lessee-dealer or open-dealer 
stations by 6 (10) cents.30  
While regression analyses make a contribution in that they identify the factors that 
determine retail prices, regression results cannot be used to calculate what prices would be for 
stations under different market structures because they do not establish a causal relationship 
between prices and market structure. 
Meanwhile, there are not many papers which have estimated structural models in the 
retail gasoline market because it is difficult to obtain quantity data from gas stations. They have 
included the distance between consumers and stations in a utility function to consider 
geographical differentiation between stations and then estimated the demand and supply 
                                            
27 However, Hoseken et al. (2008) showed no relationship between station density and prices. 
28 However, Hosken et al. (2008) found no association between station prices and distance to closest station. 
29 However, Pennerstorfer (2009), using data on 400 stations in Lower Austria, argued that the competitive effect of unbranded 
stations may be muted because an increase in the number of independent stations meant fewer branded stations, reducing price 
competition among branded stations. 
30 However, Hastings (2004), Hosken et al. (2008) and Nam and Oh (2010) did not find that an increase in the number of 
company-owned stations affected local prices. 
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model of Berry et al. (1995),31 largely in order to calculate the price impacts of mergers.32 
Manuszak (2010) used the monthly data of open-dealer stations on two Hawaiian islands (Maui 
and Kauai) between 1990 and 1995.33 He examined the effects of hypothetical mergers of 
upstream petroleum companies on the retail prices and welfare of refiners, stations and 
consumers. For example, a Chevron-Texaco merger in July 1995 was predicted to cause a 2.6 
cents/gallon increase in the retail prices of the affiliated stations and a 0.3 cents/gallon increase 
in those of non-affiliated stations. Houde (2012) used the bimonthly data of stations in Quebec, 
Canada, between 1991 and 2001.34 He specified commuting paths as the locations of 
consumers because stations along driving routes of consumers required the same shopping 
costs. He showed that an Ultramar-Sunoco merger in Quebec in January 1997 was predicted to 
cause a 0.38 cents/liter increase in the prices of the competitors near the Sunoco stations, 
which was similar to the results from a difference-in-difference retrospective analysis. 
 My research is more similar to Thomadsen (2005) in that I estimate demand and 
supply models without quantity data from stations. Thomadsen (2005) used cross-sectional 
data from 100 McDonald and Burger King outlets in Santa Clara County, California, in 1999. He 
found that the impact of mergers on prices decreased as the distance between the merging 
outlets increased. However, he used cross-sectional data because hamburger prices are 
                                            
31 Davis (2006) also used the structural model based on geographical differentiation in the movie theater industry.   
32 See Whinston (2007) and Budzinski and Ruhmer(2009) for survey papers about merger simulation.  
33 The data do not include company-owned stations. 
34 He assumed that refiners could directly control the gasoline prices of stations through nonlinear pricing, which was equivalent 
to the assumption that all of the stations in Quebec were vertically integrated with refiners. 
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relatively stable over time, while I use short-term panel data because gasoline prices change 
frequently at the station level. 
 
2.3 Retail Gasoline Industry and Data 
 
2.3.1 Retail Gasoline Industry 
 
Gasoline is provided to final consumers in three ways. The first way is that refiners 
directly supply gasoline to certain consumers who usually need a large amount of gasoline. 
Such consumers include airlines and the Department of Defense. In 2007, 11.7% of domestically 
consumed gas was provided in this way. The second way is that refiners sell gasoline to stations, 
and then stations provide gasoline to consumers. In 2007, 44.4% of domestically consumed gas 
was supplied in this way. The last way is that wholesalers buy gasoline from refiners and sell it 
to the stations, who sell it to their customers. This accounted for 43.9% of domestically 
consumed gas in 2007.35,36  
Until 2002, refiners had set the wholesale gasoline price based on the crude oil price. 
When the crude price was high, the domestic retail gasoline price might be higher than the 
                                            
35 Gas stations may make fake gasoline or purchase from other sources. The Korea Petroleum Quality and Distribution Authority, 
on average, inspects the quality of gasoline at all stations three times a year. When stations are found to be making or purchasing 
fake gasoline, they receive fines or business suspensions. In Seoul, the authority found fake gasoline in only 3.1% of inspection 
cases in 2010. 
36 By a law, branded gas stations must buy the same brand gasoline. But, some stations might buy different brand gasoline when 
its price is lower. There is no official statistics about the ratio. However, the transaction is illegal and thus the ratio is expected to 
be low. 
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international gasoline price. In fact, imported gasoline was 6.3% of total consumption in 2002. 
At that time they started setting the wholesale gasoline price based on the international 
gasoline price.37 As a result, the importing of gasoline almost disappeared. For example, no 
gasoline was imported between 2006 and 2011.   
There are four refiners in Korea: SK, GS, HD and S-Oil, in order of market share. Korea 
had 12,803 stations in December 2012. The numbers of stations with the SK, GS, HD and S-Oil 
brands were 4296 (33.6%), 3164 (24.7%), 2345 (18.3%) and 1942 (15.2%), respectively. The 
number of independent stations was 1056 (8.2%). However, the ratio of independent stations 
was lower in the city than in the country. For example, in Seoul, while the numbers of the SK, 
GS, HD and S-Oil stations were 259 (41%), 189 (30%), 91 (14.4%) and 72 (11.4%), that of the 
independent stations was only 20 (3.2%). 
There are four types of vertical relationships between refiners and stations.38 First, 
company-owned stations are owned by refiners, and managers are employed by the refiners. 
Therefore, the retail gasoline prices are determined by the refiners. Second, stations under 
wholesaler-owned contracts are owned and operated by a wholesaler who is not a refiner. Each 
wholesaler tends to own more than two stations and buy gasoline from only one refiner.  
Finally, open-dealer station refiners own and manage their own stations and have no 
investment from refiners.39 The numbers of company-owned, wholesaler-owned and 
                                            
37 The international gasoline price refers to the mean price of oil traded through Singapore as per the data from Platts, a 
commodity information and trading company. 
38 For details of contractual forms, see Shepard (1993).  
39 There are also lessee-dealer stations. Under the contract, the land and the facility are owned by the refiner, but the managers 
are self-employed. Therefore, the retail prices are determined by the managers, but the refiners have the right to control and 
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open-dealer stations in Korea were 1117 (8.7%), 654 (5.1%) and 11,032 (86.2%) in December 
2012. However, the ratio of company-owned stations is much higher in the city than in the 
country. For example, the numbers of company-owned, wholesaler-owned and open-dealer 
stations in Seoul were 198 (31.4%), 82 (13.0%) and 351 (55.6%) in December 2012.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the number of gas stations in Seoul decreased by 8.7% 
from 691 in January 2008 to 631 in December 2012 (Figure 2.1). The trend varies with brand 
and form of vertical contract. Interestingly, most of the reduction results from a decrease in the 
number of company-owned SK stations. Figure 2.2 shows that the number of company-owned 
SK stations decreases sharply by 36.2% from 116 in January 2008 to 74 in December 2012, while 
the number of company-owned GS and S-Oil stations decreases only slightly, and the number of 
company-owned HD stations increases slightly. Moreover, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, the 
wholesaler-owned and open-dealer stations do not show a clear declining trend like the 
company-owned SK stations, either.  
Even though this phenomenon is outside the scope of this study, a decline in margins 
and characteristics of SK might explain it. In Seoul during the same period, the margins of the 
gas stations fell because average weekly retail gasoline prices increased by 58.1% from 1349.83 
to 2133.96 won/liter, while average weekly wholesale gasoline prices increased by 74.5% from 
1144.93 to 1997.45 won/liter.40,41 SK is also different from other refiners in that it operates 
                                                                                                                                            
inspect the quality of the stations. Some rental fees are included in the contracts. The number of lessee-dealer stations is not 
known, but is considered to be very small. 
40 During the same period, the weekly prices of Dubai crude oil increased by 261.2% from $38.23 to $138.09 per barrel. 
41 In addition, since January 2012, the Korean government implemented a policy to increase the number of unbranded stations by 
providing a financial incentive to stations which changed from branded to unbranded stations. The government’s purpose was to 
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various businesses such as real estate and hotels. Therefore, SK has an incentive to change its 
business from the retail gasoline sector to other sectors when the margins of their gas stations 
fall below the margins of their other sectors. For example, SK built a 36-story building with 
residential and commercial units after it shut down a gas station on Yeouido in Seoul in 
September 2009. It also published plans to build business hotels after shutting down two gas 
stations in 2013. Meanwhile, open-dealer stations are likely to respond more slowly than 
company-owned stations, considering initial investment costs and recovery costs carefully.42 
 
2.3.2 Data 
  
This study uses short-term panel data from 270 gas stations located above the Han 
River in Seoul, Korea. Regular gasoline prices, locations, brands, contractual forms and average 
weekly wholesale prices were collected by Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) every 
Wednesday in June, 2009.43 Ownership and availability of a car wash service were collected by 
Korea Oil Station Association (KOSA) in January, 2009, and are assumed to be fixed until June 
2009.  
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics. The numbers of the SK, GS, HD and S-Oil stations 
are 127 (47.0%), 78 (28.9%), 32 (11.9%) and 33 (12.2%), respectively.44 The numbers of the 
                                                                                                                                            
strengthen competition in the retail gasoline market. Industry experts say this policy partly caused the margin of branded stations 
to decrease and stations to exit the market. 
42 When a station closes down, it is required to clean the site and fill the gas tank with earth. 
43 Wholesale prices are not observed at the station level.  
44 There were no independent stations during the period.  
53 
 
company-owned and non-company-owned stations are 62 (23%) and 208 (77%), and the 
number of the company-owned SK stations is 45 (16.7%). The average retail price is 1655.1 
won/liter and the average wholesale price is 1487.2 won/liter. Specifically, the average retail 
prices by brand are 1675.0 (SK), 1653.2 (GS), 1633.0 (HD) and 1604.4 (S-Oil). Car washes are 
found in 178 (65.9%) of the stations. For nine stations, the closest station is owned by the same 
owner. On average, stations have about 9 competing stations within a 1.5km radius. The 
average distance to the nearest station is 419.9m. The mean price of the land where a station is 
located is 4,595,556 won. 
I supplement the data of the gas stations with population, workers and car distribution 
across census blocks. Population is originally collected by census block. The number of workers 
is collected by administrative districts which are bigger than census blocks, and therefore the 
number of workers by census block is computed in proportion to its area size within a district. 
Similarly, the number of cars by census block is calculated in proportion to the number of 
households within a district. The data of population, workers and cars were obtained from 
Statistics Korea and Seoul City. The size of the area above the Han River in Seoul is 300.3km,2 
and there are 8130 census blocks. Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the demographic 
data. The average numbers of population, workers and cars across census blocks are 552.9, 
234.7 and 128.7, respectively.  
 
2.4 Regression Analysis 
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Before using the structural model of demand and supply, I set up the following 
reduced-form model as a preliminary analysis to get a picture of the relationship between 
market structure and retail prices at a station level:  
 
0it i i i i i i i
i i i t i i it
RP Brand Wash Pump CVS Coown Comp Dist
Popden Workden Carden WP NonCO landP


       
      

    (2-1) 
 
The dependent variable itRP  represents retail gasoline prices at station i  in week t . 
The station characteristics variables are brand iBrand , number of pumps iPump  and 
dummies indicating whether station i  has a car-wash facility or a convenience store, iWash  
and iCVS . The competition variables are number of competitors within a 1.5 km
2 radius 
iComp , distance to the nearest competing station idist  and a dummy indicating whether the 
nearest station is co-owned, iCoown . The distance between stations is computed as follows: 
the addresses of the stations are transformed into their latitudes and longitudes; then the 
straight-line distance is computed using ArcGIS, a software program for dealing with geographic 
information in maps.45 
The cost variables are average wholesale gasoline price tWP ,
46 a dummy for a 
non-company-owned station iNonCO
47 and the price of the station property ilandp . Finally, 
                                            
45 For accurate analysis, the actual driving distances should be used. However, I use the straight-line distances as an 
approximation. 
46 Note that wholesale prices are not observed at the station level.  
47 Company-owned stations avoid double marginalization and thus may charge lower prices than non-company-owned stations.  
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population density iPopden , worker density iWorkden and car density iCarden are used to 
control for local demography. These three density variables are calculated for the nearest 
census block to station i . 
The OLS estimation results are reported in Table 2.3. The signs of most of the 
coefficients for the variables are the same as would be expected. First, on average, the SK and 
GS stations charge similar prices, but they are higher than those of the other branded stations. 
The S-Oil stations are the cheapest. The ranking of the brands by price is similar to that of the 
brands by number of stations. Stations with car-wash service charge more than those without 
service. As Yoon and Lee (2008) suggest, stations with a car wash are likely to charge a higher 
gas price because the service is provided at a low price. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimates of 
number of pumps and convenience store dummy are not statistically significant even at the 10% 
level. Therefore, I exclude those two station variables from the structural model later in this 
chapter. 
Regarding the competition variables, prices decrease as the number of competing 
stations located within a 1.5km radius increase. Moreover, co-ownership increases prices. In 
other words, stations whose nearest station is also owned by the same owner charge more 
than stations whose nearest station is owned by a different owner. However, the coefficient 
estimate of distance to the nearest station is not significant. It may be because I do not include 
the full layout of station locations in the regression model (2-1). 
Regarding the cost variables, wholesale prices and land prices are positively associated 
with retail prices. However, there is no significant price difference between company-owned 
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stations and non-company-owned stations. This finding is consistent with Hastings (2004) and 
Nam and Oh (2010), while opposed to Shepard (1993). Prices at company-owned stations may 
be lower than those at non-company-owned stations because the former buy gasoline at lower 
wholesale prices than the latter. However, the prices of company-owned stations may be sticky 
and higher because the refiners, not the individual station managers, make the pricing 
decisions. 
Finally, the estimation results demonstrate that car density for the census block near 
stations is positively correlated with retail prices. High worker density is also associated with 
high gasoline prices because the workers may drive their own cars to work and use the 
surrounding gas stations.    
 
2.5 Model and Estimation 
 
While a regression analysis shows a correlation between market structure and prices, it 
has a few limitations, as discussed in Thomadsen (2005). First, it is ad hoc to define a relevant 
geographical market in a regression analysis. For example, Barron et al. (2005) define the 
market as a circle with a 1.5 mile radius, but it may not be true because the size of the market 
depends on various factors. Second, it is almost impossible to account for a complicated 
geographical distribution of stations in a regression. It may take a lot of variables to account for 
every layout. Finally, we cannot calculate what prices would be for stations under different 
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market structures because a regression model does not specify a causal relationship between 
prices and market structure.  
In order to address these problems, I estimate the structural models of supply and 
demand. In particular, because the demand model employs station locations, it is not necessary 
to define the relevant markets, and the data will reveal which stations are competitors.    
Basically, I follow the work by Berry et al. (1995) that estimated utilities and costs in 
differentiated industries from aggregate data because gas stations are geographically and 
physically differentiated. However, I do not have quantity data because gas stations keep the 
information secret. Thomadsen (2005) provided insight about how to estimate the model using 
only price data. A relationship between price and quantity from the utility functions of 
consumers is derived by the assumption of utility maximization. Then, the relationship is 
substituted into the firms’ first-order conditions of profit maximization. Therefore, the 
parameters of the utility functions and marginal costs are estimated jointly. However, this 
approach has an obvious disadvantage. Because quantity data are not used, it is to be expected 
that I get less efficient estimates than I could obtain if they were. 
 
2.5.1 Demand 
 
A discrete choice framework is used to model demand for gasoline.48 Consumers 
choose to either buy gasoline from a particular gas station or use an outside good such as public 
                                            
48 Like previous studies such as Manuszak (2010) and Houde (2012), I use the discrete choice model. However, the discrete 
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transportation. Utility is expected to decrease as consumers travel farther to buy gasoline. 
Therefore, distance from consumer to station is included in the utility function, which is similar 
to Thomadsen (2005), Davis (2006), Manuszak (2010) and Houde (2012). Formally, the indirect 
utility for consumer i  from station j  is  
 
ij j ij j ij ij ijU X D P V          ,                       (2-2) 
 
where j
X
 is a vector of dummy variables which indicate brand of station j  and whether it 
has a car-wash49; gas price is j
P
, and distance between consumer i  and station j  is ij
D
 . 
The distance between the consumer’s location and the station is also calculated using ArcGIS as 
the straight-line distance.50 Therefore, I expect the signs of   and   to be positive because 
of disutility from price and distance. A random utility shock ij

 is assumed to follow an i.i.d. 
type-I extreme value distribution.  
When consumer i  chooses the outside good 0j   , their indirect utility is  
 
                                                                                                                                            
choice model does not reflect that the consumer may decrease the amount of purchasing gasoline when the price goes up. 
Basically, this is the weakness of the model.  As an alternative, one may use two-stage approach in order to reflect the 
continuous consumption within discrete choice framework. First, the consumer chooses a station. Second, he determines the 
amount of consumption.  
49 For simplicity, I suppress the week subscript t .  
50 For an accurate analysis, the actual driving distance should be used. However, I use the straight-line distance as an 
approximation. 
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0 0 0i i iU D    ,                                (2-3) 
 
where 0iD  is the distance between the consumer and the outside good, which is considered 
to be public transportation. The model assumes that consumers who live far from bus stops or 
subway stations are likely to use their own cars. I assume that 0iD  is the distance to the 
nearest gas station, which is similar to Manuszak (2010). This is reasonable because both gas 
stations and public transportation stops are usually located near crossroads in Seoul.   
The previous studies that used the structural model based on Berry et al. (1995) 
generally included unobserved product characteristics in a utility function, commonly denoted 
as j . However, I do not include the term in equation (2-2) for two reasons. First, brand 
dummies are included and therefore unobserved brand-specific characteristics are controlled 
for. Second, I assume that consumers’ utilities from gas stations depend on observed product 
characteristics more than unobserved ones such as cleanness of the site or kindness of 
employees. The assumption seems to be reasonable, considering that 80.6% of respondents 
selected price and distance to station as the most important factors in choosing stations 
according to a survey by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) in 2010, while only 6.7% 
selected those unobserved characteristics as the most important factors.51 
The consumer will choose a gas station which delivers the highest utility if the outside 
good does not provide a greater utility. Given a utility function and ( )if  , the probability 
                                            
51 See Kim et al. (2010) for details. 
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density of the ( 1)J   dimensional vector i , then the share of consumers in location b  who 
buy gasoline from station j  is   
 
 ( , | , , ) ( )
j
jb i i
A
S P X f d      ,                      (2-4) 
 
where  P  is the vector of retail prices at gas stations in the market, and  
 
 , , , ,0{ | ( ) ( )}j i i j i k i j iA V V t j V V                   (2-5) 
 
is the set of i  with which a consumer i  obtains greater utility in choosing station j  than 
any other station k  or the outside good. Because i  is assumed to follow an i.i.d. type-I 
extreme value distribution, the share of consumers in location b  who choose station j   is 
 
 
0
0
1
( , | , , )
1
j bj b j
k bk b k
X D D P
jb J X D D P
k
e
S P X
e
   
   
  
   
   



.            (2-6) 
 
Because car owners are consumers to gas stations, I use the number of cars for 
consumers across census blocks. I also assume that the consumers in each census block are 
located at the centroid of the census block because census data contains no information about 
their distribution within the census block. However, this assumption is not too problematic 
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because census blocks are small enough that there are only 128 cars in one census block, on 
average.   
Therefore, the quantity of demand for each station is calculated by summing across all 
8130 census blocks, the product of the share of consumers in location b  who choose the 
station and the number of consumers at the location, ( )h b : 
 
 ( , | , , ) ( ) ( , | , , )j jb
b
Q P X h b S P X      .            (2-7) 
 
In addition, the derivative of demand with respect to price is 
 
( , | , , ) ( , | , , )
( )
j jb
bk k
Q P X S P X
h b
P P
      

 
 .               (2-8) 
 
2.5.2 Supply 
 
I assume that stations play a static Bertrand game and station owners choose prices at 
each of their stations in order to maximize the joint profits of all of their stations. This 
assumption is reasonable, considering that stations can sell as much gasoline as is demanded at 
the posted prices because gasoline is provided to stations frequently, and prices can be 
changed at the station level easily and quickly.  
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Suppose that there are F  station owners, each owning a subset fF  of the 
1,...,j J  stations. The profits to station owner f  at week t  are 
 
 ( ( ) ( ) )
f
ft jt jt t jt jt t jt
j F
P Q P c Q P FC

    .                      (2-9) 
 
where jtc  is the marginal cost and jtFC  is the fixed cost of station j  in week t .   
I assume that the station’s marginal cost is equal to the sum of the cost of the gasoline 
purchased from the upstream supplier (at wholesale gasoline prices) and a zero-mean, 
unobserved station-specific portion of the marginal costs. I also assume that wholesale prices at 
the station level depend on the brand, contractual form and week.52 Therefore, station j ’s 
marginal cost in week t  is 
 
 jt b b v v t t jtc c c c       ,                        (2-10) 
 
where ,  b vc c  and tc  are dummies indicating brands, contractual forms and weeks, 
respectively. Different branded stations face different wholesale prices because they purchase 
from different wholesalers. Non-company-owned stations may purchase gasoline at higher 
wholesale prices than company-owned ones because of double marginalization. Therefore, I 
introduce contract dummies to verify the possibility in the supply model. For estimation 
                                            
52 Transportation cost may affects wholesale prices, but I omit the factor because the impact is expected to be very small. 
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purposes, vertical contracts are classified into two types (company-owned and 
non-company-owned) to reduce the number of parameters. The introduction of different 
contractual forms in the supply model distinguishes it from previous studies. For example, 
Manuszak (2010) and Houde (2012) used only one type of vertical contract in the supply model 
because of data limitations.53 Obviously, wholesale prices also change over weeks, because 
refiners change prices every week.54 For estimation purposes, I use a variable for average 
wholesale price instead of three weekly dummies to reduce the number of parameters. The 
station-specific portion of marginal costs is attributed to the work efficiency of the employees 
and the management of the station because gasoline is very similar across all of the stations. 
Note that b b v v t tc c c     is independent of jt  because jt  depends on the ability and 
experience of individuals and does not vary over four weeks, while the wholesale price changes 
every week. As is commonly done in the literature, I assume that station owners know jt  
when they set prices, but the econometrician cannot observe it.  
Station owner f  maximizes the profit function (2-9) and therefore the first-order 
condition of station j  in week t  is 
 
 
( )
( ) ( ) 0
f
rt t
jt t rt b b v v t t jt
r F jt
Q P
Q P P c c c
P
   


     

 .         (2-11) 
 
                                            
53 Manuszak (2010) used open-dealer stations on two islands in Hawaii. Houde (2012) assumed that refiners could directly 
control gasoline prices of stations through nonlinear pricing, which is equivalent to the assumption that all stations in Quebec are 
vertically integrated with the refiners. 
54 It is well known that refiners implement weekly pricing in Korea.  
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For notational convenience, define a matrix   as  
 
 
if  and  have the same owner
0 otherwise.
m
jjm
Q
m j
P

   


             (2-12) 
 
Now, the first-order condition in matrix notation is rewritten as 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0b b v v t tQ P P C C C         ,            (2-13) 
 
where ( ),  ,  ,  ,  and b v tQ P C C C   are the vector of the quantities of the station, dummies of 
brand, contractual form and week, and station-specific marginal cost, respectively.  
Because I do not have quantity data, I substitute equations (2-7) and (2-8) into equation 
(2-13), which yields 
 
 ( , | ) ( , | )( ) 0b b v v t tQ P X P X P C C C                     (2-14) 
 
where ( , , )       . Finally, I derive the residual vector for the generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimation: 
 
1( , | ) ( , | )b b v v t tP C C C P X Q P X     
     .          (2-15) 
65 
 
 
2.5.3 Instrumental Variables and Estimation 
  
Given a vector of instrumental variables, Z  that are uncorrelated with j  but 
correlated with price jP , a moment condition for GMM estimation is  
 
 *[ ( ) | ] 0j jE Z                               (2-16) 
 
where *  is the true value of  .  
I use brand dummies, a non-company-owned dummy and average wholesale prices as 
the instruments. They shift the marginal costs of the stations.55 By assumption, the unobserved 
component j  of marginal cost is not correlated with these three components that make up 
wholesale prices at the station level. However, the instruments are correlated with the 
marginal costs of the stations and therefore the prices. 
I also use demand shifters as instruments. First, I use the number of competing stations 
within 1km, 1.5km, …, 3.5km and 4km. The distance to the nearest station is also used as an 
instrument. Considering the spatial differentiation in the retail gasoline industry, these 
instruments are consistent with ones suggested by Berry et al. (1995) that are related to 
characteristics of competing products. Manuszak (2010) and Houde (2012) use similar 
instrumental variables, even though the distance criteria are different.  
                                            
55 They also shift demand. 
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Second, demographic data are used as instruments. I use the population density and 
worker density in the nearest census block to the station. These instruments shift demand 
because sales increase when stations are located near more potential customers. 
Third, I use a car-wash indicator as an observed station characteristic. However, I 
exclude other characteristics such as the number of pumps and a dummy for a convenience 
store because their coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant in a regression analysis. 
Table 2.4 shows the correlation coefficients between retail prices and the instruments. 
The signs of the correlation coefficients are the same as would be expected. Number of 
competing stations within a certain radius is negatively correlated with retail prices, while 
distance to the nearest station is positively correlated. SK’s dummy is positively correlated with 
prices, while S-Oil’s dummy is negatively correlated. The correlation between average 
wholesale prices and retail prices is also positive. However, population density is negatively 
correlated with retail prices, while worker density is positively correlated. This may not be 
surprising when we consider the fact that areas with high worker density usually have low 
population density. The correlation coefficient between the two density measures is indeed 
negative (-0.1593). 
Formally, a set of instruments 
1 2( , , , )NZ z z z  is used in the estimation. Therefore, 
the sample analog of the moment condition is as follows.56 
                                            
56 As an alternative, I added a moment condition which requires the sum of the estimated demand for the stations located in each 
district to match the actual sales data: 
1 1
1
( ) [ ( ) ]
dD J
d d
D j
d j
G Q S
D
 
 
   , where d  and S  denote the district and sales 
data, respectively. However, the estimation results do not change much and are reported in Table 2.6.  
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 1
1
( ) ( )
J
J j j
j
G Z
J
  

 
.                         (2-17) 
 
The GMM estimator then is the value of ˆ  that solves   
 
 ˆ
arg  min  ( ) ( )J JG AG

 
,                         (2-18) 
 
where A  is a weighting matrix for the moments. For the non-linear search for parameters, I 
use the Nelder-Mead (1995) non-derivative simplex method.57,58 
 
2.5.4 Identification 
 
As discussed in Thomadsen (2001) and Thomadsen (2005), the parameters in both the 
demand and supply models can be separately identified because of geography and the use of 
both demand and cost shifters as instruments. 
Equation (2-14) can be rewritten as  
 
 
1( , | ) ( , | )b b v v t tP C C C P X Q P X     
     .  
                                            
57 A quasi-Newton method, which is one of the usual search methods, may be used. However, the Nelder-Mead (1995) simplex 
method is known to be more robust than the quasi-Newton method. See Nevo (2000a) for details. 
58 See Knittel and Metaaxoglou (2008) for examples of searching processes and algorithms. 
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Therefore, price has two components. The first is the cost component from the supply 
side that consists of the first three terms on the right side. The component does not vary 
according to the competitive environment of the station. The second component is the mark-up 
component from the demand side that consists of the fourth term on the right side. This term 
varies in different competitive environments because the price elasticity of each station 
depends on the number of competing stations nearby and how far away they are.  
In addition, as mentioned above, the cost shifters and demand shifters are used as the 
instruments. Therefore, using data from stations that have the same brand and contractual 
form in a wide variety of competitive environments, I can separate out the constant supply side 
of the model from the station-specific demand side of the model. In particular, the parameters 
of the brand dummies on both the demand and supply sides are identified separately.59 
 
2.6 Estimation Results and Validity Check 
 
2.6.1 Estimates 
 
                                            
59 For example, if the functional form of the mark-up component is linear in brand dummies, the coefficients of the dummies in 
both the demand and the cost side could not be separately identified. However, brand dummies in demand side are interacted with 
price because the mark-up term consists of the multiplication between 
1 matrix and Q matrix, and each element in Q  
consists of the multiplication of 
jXe

 and 
Pe   as shown in equation (2-6). Therefore, the brand dummies in both the 
demand side and the cost side can be separately identified. 
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The estimates of the demand and cost parameters are reported in Table 2.5. First, the 
p-value of the chi-square test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.78. Therefore, I conclude that 
the instruments are exogenous and overidentification is not a problem.  
Next, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficient estimates seem to be reasonable. For 
the demand parameters, the coefficients of price and distance from consumers to station are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which implies the disutility of price and 
distance. From the two estimates, the travel cost, which is 646 won/km, is computed by 
dividing the coefficient of distance by the coefficient of price. The implied travel cost seems 
reasonable, considering that the bus fare in Seoul was 700 or 800 won in 2009.60 
For the cost parameters, the average wholesale price coefficient and the estimate of 
the dummy that indicates a non-company-owned contract are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The result makes sense because non-company-owned stations are 
highly likely to purchase gasoline at higher prices than company-owned stations. 
 
2.6.2 Validity Check of Estimated Model 
 
Before conducting the counterfactual analysis, I check if the estimates are credible in 
order to have confidence in the estimated model. For this, I do a regression analysis and 
compute the price elasticities for the gas stations.   
                                            
60 Some credit cards have the benefit of a 50-won/liter discount for certain branded stations. Considering that consumers, on 
average, purchase 30 liters at a time, they can get a 1,500-won discount per purchase. They usually drive more than 1km to find a 
station where they can get such a discount. Therefore, the travel cost seems reasonable. 
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2.6.2.1 Regression 
 
In section 2.4, a regression analysis was performed with actual prices. Here, I run a 
regression of the predicted prices from the structural model on the same regressors. If the 
estimates from the two regressions are similar in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, 
I can have confidence in the estimated model.  
The OLS estimation results are given in Table 2.7. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimation 
results from the original and predicted prices, respectively. Two results are noted. First, the 
coefficients estimates from the predicted prices are similar to or at least of the same order of 
magnitude as those from the original prices. Second, the coefficient estimates of many of the 
variables are still statistically significant, even though the degree lessens. For example, thirteen 
estimates are statistically significant when actual prices are used as the dependent variable, 
while nine estimates are statistically significant when predicted prices are used. The slight 
decline in the degree of statistical significance results from differences between the original 
prices and the fitted prices, which may be due to the fact that quantity data are not used in the 
model. 
Hence, I have some confidence that the estimated model is not too problematic.   
 
2.6.2.2 Elasticity 
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I calculate own-price elasticities and cross-price elasticities for nine gas stations located 
in a district (Jung-gu) of Seoul. Table 2.8 provides the price elasticities. A map of the stations is 
shown in Figure 2.5. The nine stations are located along a big street (Toegye-ro) which has six 
lanes. The own-price elasticities for all of the stations are negative and range from -3.53 to 
-3.88. The results are consistent with Wang (2009) who found that own-price elasticities for 
eight gasoline stations ranged from -3.23 to -7.43 in the Perth, Australia, metropolitan area. In 
addition, the cross-price elasticities between stations are positive and decrease as the distance 
between them increases, as expected. For example, as found in Figure 2.5, the station in the 
first row in Table 2.7 is the left-most one on Toegye-ro. The cross-elasticities decrease as the 
distance from that station to the eight other stations increases, as shown in the table.    
The signs and the magnitudes of the elasticities seem to be realistic. Therefore, I have 
some confidence in the estimated model. 
 
2.7 Counterfactual Analysis 
 
The sharp decline in the number of company-owned SK stations may imply four 
possible scenarios. First, they may have changed brands, which means that they became 
company-owned GS or HD stations.61 Second, they may have changed vertical contracts, which 
means that they became non-company-owned SK stations. Third, they may have changed both 
brands and contracts, which means that they became non-company-owned GS or HD stations. 
                                            
61 S-Oil does not have company-owned stations.  
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Finally, they may have exited the market. Motivated by such changes, I use the estimation 
results to conduct four types of counterfactual experiment and to estimate the impact of the 
change in market structure on the market prices and welfare.  
A vector of new equilibrium prices cfP  is obtained under counterfactuals by solving 
the following equation, given the coefficient estimates from the demand and supply models.62 
 
1ˆ ˆ( , | ) ( , | )
cf
cf post cf cfP mc P X Q P X   ,                   (2-19) 
 
where mc ˆ ˆ ˆ( )b b v v t tC C C      represents a vector of the marginal costs implied by the 
estimates from the structural model.  
One of the advantages of the structural model is that I can calculate the changes in 
consumer welfare and producer welfare. Welfare change under the counterfactual is computed 
using the data from the fourth Wednesday in July, 2009. The change in consumer welfare is 
measured by a compensating variation. Small and Rosen (1981), Nevo (2000), and Knittel and 
Metaxoglou (2008) show that the compensating variation for consumer i  is given by 
 
 0 0
ln exp( ) ln exp( )
J J
post pre
ij ij
j j
i
V V
CV

 



 
,                     (2-20) 
 
                                            
62 See Knittel and Metaxoglou (2011) for the actual computation process using Matlab. 
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where ijV  comes from equation (2-2). 
Therefore, the change in total consumer welfare is computed by 
 
 ( ) ib
b
h b CV ,                               (2-21) 
 
where 
ibCV  is the compensating variation for consumer i  located in census block b . For the 
welfare change on an annual basis, I assume that consumers purchase 30 liters of gasoline at a 
time and visit gas stations four times a month, based on Kim et al. (2010).  
The change in viable profits for each station owner f  is calculated by 
 
   
0
0ˆ ˆ( , ; ) ( , ; )
cf
cf
f f
P mc P mc   ,                    (2-22) 
 
where 0P  is the initial set of prices. Therefore, the change in total producer profits is given by 
 
 
0
0ˆ ˆ[ ( , ; ) ( , ; )]
cf
cf
f f f
P mc P mc    .                  (2-23) 
 
Finally, the change in total welfare is calculated by summing up the change in total 
consumer welfare and the change in total producer profits.63  
 
                                            
63 See Petrin (2002) for an example of quantifying the effects of new products on prices and welfare. 
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2.7.1 Change in Brands 
 
The first counterfactual is that company-owned SK stations become company-owned 
GS or HD stations. The change is similar to the assumption that the GS or HD companies acquire 
company-owned SK stations. Therefore, the elements of matrix   in equation (2-19) are 
changed to reflect the change in ownership. In addition, because the brand is changed for the 
company-owned SK stations, the marginal cost ( mc ) and station characteristics ( X ) are also 
changed in equation (2-19). Table 2.9 shows the effects of brand change on average price and 
welfare on an annual basis. When company-owned SK stations become company-owned GS 
(HD) stations, the average price of the stations decreases by 5.33 (10.95) won/liter and the 
consumer surplus decreases by $111.22 (146.18) million per year. In addition, the viable profits 
for the producers decrease by $14.99 (20.03) million per year. Therefore, total welfare 
decreases by $126.21 million per year for GS-SK mergers and by $166.21 million per year for 
HD-SK mergers. 
Because this counterfactual is similar to mergers between competitors, the prices of 
the company-owned GS (HD) stations increase. However, there are only 8 (9) of them, which is 
small. Therefore, the effect of price increases on the average price is limited. Meanwhile, the 
base utility of GS (HD) stations is smaller than that of SK stations, as found in Table 2.5. Hence, 
the prices of the company-owned SK stations decrease, of which there are 45. The prices of all 
stations besides company-owned SK, GS and HD stations increase slightly because strong 
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competitors have disappeared. Overall, average price decreases and consumer welfare also 
decreases.  
This case is an interesting one, especially to a competition agency because both 
average price and consumer welfare decrease. In general, when an agency reviews a merger, it 
focuses on whether or not the post-merger price increases, because an increase in price is 
usually considered a decrease in consumer welfare. However, this case suggests that a merger 
may lead to a decrease in consumer welfare despite a decrease in price, or conversely an 
increase in consumer welfare despite an increase in price, because a change in consumer utility 
resulted from a change in product quality. 
 
2.7.2 Change in Vertical Contracts 
 
To see the impact of vertical contracts on prices and welfare, it is assumed that 
company-owned SK stations become non-company-owned SK stations. Two opposing effects 
are expected. First, the marginal costs of stations may increase because non-company-owned 
stations purchase gasoline at higher wholesale prices than company-owned ones. Second, 
because ownership transfers to an individual, prices may decrease, which is opposite to the 
effect of a merger on prices. Therefore, we can anticipate differences in price change among 
the company-owned SK stations according to their geography. The prices of company-owned SK 
stations located far from other company-owned SK stations will increase because of an increase 
in marginal cost, while the prices of company-owned SK stations located close to other 
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company-owned SK stations will decrease, or increase less, because of the two opposing 
effects.  
Figure 2.6 shows the locations of the 45 company-owned SK stations. In fact, the prices 
of the stations, marked as triangles, located far from others increase, while the prices of the 
stations, marked as circles, located close to others decrease under the counterfactual.  
This suggests that vertical and horizontal mergers have different impacts on price. A 
change in contractual form is similar to a vertical merger for stations located far from others, 
while it is similar to a horizontal merger for stations located close to others. Horizontal mergers 
tend to increase price by reducing competition, while vertical mergers may decrease price by 
internalizing double marginalization.64  
The overall effects of change in contractual form are given in Table 2.10. Average price 
decreases by 5.92 won/liter.65 It means that the decreasing effect of ownership change on 
price outweighs the increasing effect of marginal cost change on price. Consumer welfare 
increases by $12.81 million per year, while viable profits decrease by $32.77 million per year. 
Hence, total welfare decreases by $19.96 million per year.  
 
2.7.3. Change in Both Brands and Vertical Contracts 
 
                                            
64
 The Department of Justice, a competition agency in the U.S., gives more weight to expected efficiencies in determining 
whether to challenge a vertical merger than in determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger (U.S. Department of Justice 
Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1984). 
65 The prices of 15 of the 45 company-owned SK stations increase, and the prices of 30 decrease. The prices of other stations 
also change, and the average price decreases overall.   
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The case where company-owned SK stations become non-company-owned S-Oil 
stations is examined.66 The prices of the stations are expected to decrease because (1) the 
decreasing effect of ownership change on price is bigger than the increasing effect of marginal 
cost on price, as shown in Section 2.7.2; and (2) the coefficient estimate of the S-Oil dummy for 
marginal cost in Table 2.5 is negative, which shows that the wholesale price of S-Oil is the 
lowest among the four refiners. 
  The prices of most of the company-owned SK stations decrease under the 
counterfactual. As a result of price competition, the prices of the other stations also decrease. 
Therefore, there is a big difference between this counterfactual experiment and other 
counterfactual experiments where only brand or contractual form changes. Under this 
counterfactual, the prices of most stations decrease, while under the other counterfactuals, the 
prices of some stations decrease and some increase. Therefore, under this counterfactual, 
consumer welfare increases the most among the three counterfactual experiments so far.  
Obviously, this result supports the conventional belief that a big increase in consumer 
welfare arises from price competition among stations.  
Table 2.11 shows that average price decreases by 29.3 won/liter, which is 1.72% of the 
average price on the fourth Wednesday in June, 2009. Consumer welfare increases by $381.36 
million per year, and producer profits decrease by $27.45 million per year, which yields an 
increase of $353.91 million per year in total welfare. 
                                            
66 The case where company-owned SK stations become non-company-owned GS (or HD) stations is not reported. It is similar to 
the case where they become non-company-owned S-Oil stations, even though the magnitude of the effects on average price and 
welfare are different. 
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2.7.4 Exit from Market 
 
Finally, the case that all company-owned SK stations exit the retail gasoline market is 
assumed. Because we found a negative relationship between number of stations and average 
price in Chapter 1, average price is expected to increase. 
Table 2.12 shows the impacts of the counterfactual experiment. Average price 
increases by 9.43 won/liter. Consumer welfare decreases by $144.37 million per year, and 
producer profits increase by $10.56 million. Therefore, total welfare falls by $133.81 million.  
The exit of 45 company-owned SK stations among the 270 total stations equals a 16.67% 
reduction in the number of stations. It leads to a 0.55% increase in average price on the fourth 
Wednesday in June, 2009. This is equivalent to the finding that a 10% decrease in station 
density is correlated with a 0.33% increase in average price. 
A 0.33% increase in average price is lower than the result in Chapter 1 where I found 
that a 10% decrease in the number of stations was associated with a 0.69% increase in average 
price. There are two factors to explain the difference between the two numbers. First, market 
concentration was controlled for in Chapter 1, while exit of stations is included not only in 
number of stations but also in change in market concentration. Second, the impact of station 
density on average price is expected to be smaller in Seoul than in other cities, because stations 
in Seoul face a bigger demand due to the high population or car density. Therefore, the effect 
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of station density on price is similar in both the structural and regression models, using an 
instrumental variable. 
The Korean government has implemented a policy to induce the conversion of 
full-service branded stations to self-service independent stations by giving some financial 
incentives since January 2012. The policy was originally introduced in order to strengthen 
competition and lower gasoline price.  
Recently, the number of stations in Korea has started to decrease because their margin 
is dropping as crude oil prices increase.67 The counterfactual analysis suggests that the 
conversion policy may lead to unanticipated effects because it can accelerate the exit of 
stations and thus increase the price. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Motivated by the decline in the number of company-owned SK stations in Seoul, I 
evaluate the impacts of change in market structure on price and welfare through 
counterfactual experiments. Because a regression analysis cannot do the job, I set up the 
structural model of demand and supply.  
However, sales data from gas stations are not accessible. Therefore, I build the model 
on the work of Thomadsen (2005) instead of Berry et al. (1995). The relationship between price 
and quantity is derived from utility maximization. Then the relationship is substituted into firms’ 
                                            
67 The number of stations in Korea reached to 13,003 in Dec. 2010. Since then, it decreased by 2.4% to 12,687 in Dec. 2013.
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first-order condition from static Bertrand competition to jointly estimate the parameters of the 
utility and marginal cost functions. 
After checking the validity of the estimated model, I observe the following results 
through counterfactual experiments. First, the change in company-owned GS and HD stations 
decreases average price. This is because their prices increase, but the prices of company-owned 
SK stations decrease. Consumer welfare also decreases because the base utility of GS and HD 
stations is smaller than for SK stations. The case suggests that both average price and consumer 
welfare increase or decrease in the same direction after a merger. Second, the change to 
non-company-owned SK stations decreases average price because the decreasing effect of 
ownership change on price outweighs an increase in marginal cost. The counterfactual 
experiment implies that horizontal and vertical mergers have different effects on the 
post-merger price, which is consistent with the practices of a U.S. competition agency. Third, 
the change to non-company-owned S-Oil stations greatly decreases average price mainly 
because the refiner’s wholesale price is the lowest among the four refiners. This supports the 
conventional belief that a big increase in consumer welfare arises from price competition 
among stations. Finally, the exit of stations increases average price because it reduces 
competition. In particular, the result from the structural model is similar to the result from the 
regression analysis using an instrumental variable in Chapter 1. 
The counterfactual analysis shows that drop in the number of gas stations leads to very 
different effects on price and welfare, depending on how brand and contractual form change. 
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Therefore, it implies that policies to affect market structure should be developed and 
implemented with caution because they may have unanticipated effects.    
82 
 
 Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Number of Gas Stations in Seoul 
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Figure 2.2 Number of Company-Owned Gas Stations in Seoul 
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Figure 2.3 Number of Wholesaler-Owned Gas Stations in Seoul 
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Figure 2.4 Number of Open-Dealer Gas Stations in Seoul 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of Gas Stations Data 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Retail price 1080 1655.119 88.130 1479 1931 
Wholesale Price 1080 1487.233 36.577 1450.65 1543.03 
SK Dummy 1080 0.470 0.499 0 1 
GS Dummy 1080 0.289 0.453 0 1 
HD Dummy 1080 0.119 0.323 0 1 
S-Oil Dummy 1080 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Car Wash 1080 0.659 0.474 0 1 
Non-Company-Owned 1080 0.770 0.421 0 1 
Co-Owned Nearest Stations 1080 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Number of Stations within 1.5km 1080 9.141 4.183 0 21 
Population Density 1080 26.648 23.683 0 151.683 
Worker Density 1080 8.302 7.522 0.3028 63.216 
Car Density 1080 6.178 4.826 0 29.149 
Distance to Nearest Station 1080 419.888 279.332 20.669 2528.594 
Land Price 1080 4595.556 2285.484 1110 15300 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Demographic Data 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Population 8130 552.878 217.153 0 2543 
Workers 8130 234.723 1043.912 0.825 43,801.3 
Cars 8130 128.719 63.743 0 751.531 
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Table 2.3 OLS Estimation Results 
Variables Price 
  
Constant 252.9*** 
 (41.79) 
GS Dummy -13.72 
 (9.616) 
HD Dummy -31.46*** 
 (11.54) 
S-Oil Dummy -46.47*** 
 (9.606) 
Car Wash 20.68*** 
 (7.447) 
Number of Pumps 0.105 
 (0.763) 
Convenience Store -1.032 
 (10.80) 
Non-Company-Owned 9.960 
 (10.82) 
Co-Owned Nearest Stations 67.14*** 
 (14.80) 
Number of Stations within 
1.5km 
-6.840*** 
 (1.027) 
Distance to Nearest Station -0.00329 
 (0.0150) 
Population Density -1.124*** 
 (0.412) 
Worker Density 1.770*** 
 (0.517) 
Car Density 4.487** 
 (2.083) 
Land Price 0.00809*** 
 (0.00176) 
Wholesale Price 0.945*** 
 (0.0195) 
  
Observations 1080 
R-Squared 0.509 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.4 Correlation Coefficients between Retail Prices and Instruments 
Instruments Correlation Coefficients 
Number of Competitors within 1km -0.2945 
Number of Competitors within 1.5km -0.3735 
Number of Competitors within 2km -0.3554 
Number of Competitors within 2.5km -0.3758 
Number of Competitors within 3km -0.3344 
Number of Competitors within 3.5km -0.3232 
Number of Competitors within 4km -0.2992 
Distance to the Nearest Station 0.0783 
SK Dummy 0.213 
HD Dummy -0.0921 
S-Oil Dummy -0.215 
Non-Company-Owned -0.0348 
Wholesale Prices 0.3921 
Population Density -0.1567 
Worker Density 0.2521 
Car Wash 0.084 
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Table 2.5 Estimation Results from Structural Model 
 Variables Coefficient Estimates 
Demand 
Side 
Constant 
8.757 
(7.793) 
GS Base Utility 
-1.525 
(1.176) 
HD Base Utility 
-6.973 
(5.650) 
S-Oil Base Utility 
1.403*** 
(0.446) 
Price Sensitivity ( )  -2.308** 
(1.111) 
Distance Disutility ( )  
-1.492*** 
(0.254) 
Car Wash 
0.213 
(0.237) 
Supply 
Side 
Constant 
0.057 
(0.291) 
Marginal Cost GS 
0.033 
(0.023) 
Marginal Cost HD 
0.036 
(0.041) 
Marginal Cost S-Oil 
-0.137*** 
(0.039) 
Non-Company-Owned 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
Average Wholesale Price 
0.709*** 
(0.068) 
 Implied Travel Costs ( /  )  0.646 
 Objective Function (Degree of Freedom) 1.087(3) 
 2  p -Value 0.780 
         (1) SK dummy is used as a base dummy in the demand and supply model. 
         (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.6 Estimation Results from Structural Model with Additional Moment Condition 
 Variables Coefficient Estimates 
Demand 
Side 
Constant 
7.821 
(6.005) 
GS Base Utility 
-1.401 
(1.581) 
HD Base Utility 
-4.433 
(3.656) 
S-Oil Base Utility 
1.042*** 
(0.362) 
Price Sensitivity ( )  -2.266*** 
(0.613) 
Distance Disutility ( )  
-1.588*** 
(0.237) 
Car Wash 
0.257 
(0.187) 
Supply 
Side 
Constant 
-0.002 
(0.189) 
Marginal Cost GS 
0.072*** 
(0.017) 
Marginal Cost HD 
0.057* 
(0.034) 
Marginal Cost S-Oil 
-0.113*** 
(0.030) 
Non-Company-Owned 
0.093*** 
(0.026) 
Average Wholesale Price 
0.711*** 
(0.082) 
 Implied Travel Costs ( /  )  0.701 
 Objective Function (Degree of Freedom) 3.012(4) 
 2  p -Value 0.556 
         (1) SK dummy is used as a base dummy in the demand and supply model. 
         (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
92 
 
Table 2.7 OLS Estimation Results Using Predicted Prices 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Price Predicted price 
   
Constant 252.9*** -100.3 
 (41.79) (83.03) 
GS Dummy -13.72 -11.59 
 (9.616) (19.68) 
HD Dummy -31.46*** -31.51 
 (11.54) (24.44) 
S-Oil Dummy -46.47*** -38.21* 
 (9.606) (20.36) 
Car Wash 20.68*** 28.20* 
 (7.447) (15.31) 
Number of Pumps 0.105 -0.341 
 (0.763) (1.596) 
Convenience Store -1.032 0.212 
 (10.80) (22.01) 
Non-Company-Owned 9.960 12.50 
 (10.82) (21.37) 
Co-Owned Nearest 
Stations 
67.14*** 57.47* 
 (14.80) (32.94) 
Number of Stations 
within 1.5km 
-6.840*** -9.072*** 
 (1.027) (2.116) 
Distance to Nearest 
Station 
-1.124*** -2.095** 
 (0.412) (0.816) 
Population Density 1.770*** 3.802*** 
 (0.517) (1.058) 
Worker Density 4.487** 8.807** 
 (2.083) (4.089) 
Car Density -0.00329 -0.0202 
 (0.0150) (0.0254) 
Land Price 0.00809*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.00176) (0.00348) 
Wholesale Price 0.945*** 1.172*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0408) 
   
Observations 1,080 1,080 
R-Squared 0.509 0.326 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.5 Map of Nine Stations for Elasticity Computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
Table 2.8 Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities for Nine Stations at Jung-gu, Seoul 
 
st_76 st_86 st_88 st_91 st_93 st_97 st_100 st_109 st_122 
st_76 -3.826658 0.10053 0.066878 0.037509 0.030607 0.020399 0.014883 0.008066 0.00472 
st_86 0.020336 -3.8637 0.059104 0.043687 0.041566 0.032686 0.029616 0.018007 0.011612 
st_88 0.081612 0.356546 -3.61606 0.289516 0.281516 0.231871 0.210651 0.136506 0.089661 
st_91 0.048038 0.276588 0.303848 -3.71548 0.289853 0.272022 0.232719 0.186088 0.128265 
st_93 0.047607 0.319603 0.358819 0.352021 -3.62011 0.353812 0.36193 0.243964 0.165129 
st_97 0.033206 0.263036 0.30931 0.345755 0.370295 -3.64452 0.360058 0.298888 0.209926 
st_100 0.000031 0.000305 0.00036 0.000379 0.000485 0.000461 -3.88155 0.000366 0.000257 
st_109 0.014997 0.165502 0.207974 0.270142 0.291616 0.341364 0.326568 -3.58606 0.345472 
st_122 0.007943 0.096605 0.123653 0.16855 0.178671 0.217031 0.207009 0.312722 -3.53228 
Terms i  and j  represent row and column, respectively. Cell entries ( i , j ) show percentage change in quantity  
for station j  with a 1% change in price for station i .    
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Table 2.9 Change in Average Price and Welfare from Change in Brands 
 
Before 
Counterfactual 
After 
Counterfactual 
Change  
Average Prices 
(won/liter) 
1698.16 
GS: 1692.83 
HD: 1687.21 
GS: -5.33 
HD: -10.95 
Consumer Surplus 
($Mil) 
4422.81 
GS: 4311.59 
HD: 4276.63 
GS: -111.22 
HD: -146.18 
Variable Profits 
($Mil) 
818.76 
GS: 803.77 
HD: 798.73 
GS: -14.99 
HD: -20.03 
Total Welfare 
($Mil) 
5241.57 
GS: 5115.36 
HD: 5075.36 
GS: -126.21 
HD: -166.21 
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Table 2.10 Change in Average Price and Welfare from Change in Vertical Contracts 
 
Before 
Counterfactual 
After 
Counterfactual 
Change  
Average Prices 
(won/liter) 
1698.16 1692.24 -5.92 
Consumer Surplus 
($Mil) 
4422.81 4435.62 12.81 
Variable Profits 
($Mil) 
818.76 785.99 -32.77 
Total Welfare 
($Mil) 
5241.57 5221.62 -19.96 
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Figure 2.6 Geography of Company-Owned SK Stations 
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Table 2.11 Change in Average Price and Welfare from Change in Both Brands and Contracts 
 
Before 
Counterfactual 
After 
Counterfactual 
Change  
Average Prices 
(won/liter) 
1698.16 1668.86 -29.3 
Consumer Surplus 
($Mil) 
4422.81 4804.17 381.36 
Variable Profits 
($Mil) 
818.76 791.31 -27.45 
Total Welfare 
($Mil) 
5241.57 5595.48 353.91 
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Table 2.12 Change in Average Price and Welfare from Change in Number of Stations 
 
Before 
Counterfactual 
After 
Counterfactual 
Change  
Average Prices 
(won/liter) 
1698.16 1707.59 9.43 
Consumer Surplus 
($Mil) 
4422.81 4278.43 -144.37 
Variable Profits 
($Mil) 
818.76 829.32 10.56 
Total Welfare 
($Mil) 
5241.57 5107.75 -133.81 
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